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APOLLO EXPERIENCEREPORT
THE COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE
MILESTONEREVlEW PROCESS
By Harmon L. Brendleand JamesA. York
LyndonB. JohnsonSpaceCenter
SUMMARY
The Apollo spacecraft milestone review process was used by NASA to provide
formally documented assurance thatthe spacecraft was satisfactorilycompleting sched-
uled milestones from manufacturing to launch. The milestone review process was be-
gun with the completion of manufacturing and was continued through test and checkout
at the launch site. The applicationof thisprocess at specific intervals provided early
definitionof problem areas and timely resolution of problems and thus avoided major
program impacts. The milestone review process also imposed disciplinesupon both
NASA and contractor personnel thataided in making the Apollo Program successful.
INTRODUCTION
From the beginning of the Apollo Program, a contractual requirement to conduct
certain milestone reviews during the life cycle of each command and service module
(CSM) before launch was levied on the CSM prime contractor. The reviews were iden-
tified as Spacecraft Assessment Reviews (SAR's), Customer Acceptance Readiness
Reviews (CARR' s), and Flight Readiness Reviews (FAR' s). The agenda items for the
reviews were the responsibility of the contractor, who presented the status of the space-
craft subsystems and submitted a written report for NASA review. Significant items
from the contractor presentation and report were brought to the attention of NASA man-
agement by memorandums or by review item dispositions, in which the nature of the
problem was described and a solution was recommended. Disposition of these problems
was conducted by a review board convened by the Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program,
and consisting of NASA senior staff members.
Before acceptance of the first Apollo man-rated spacecraft (CSM 101), NASA man-
agement determined that a more disciplined and more detailed milestone review process
was required. As a result, the SAR's were discontinued and a formal plan was pre-
pared for conducting a three-phase CARR and an FRR for each CSM. The data from
each CARR and FRR were reviewed comprehensively by NASA personnel, who
determined the agenda items that were presented to the review board. This procedure
shifted the determination of significant issues for the board's review from the contrac-
tor to NASA.
The Phase I CARR was primarily a configuration assessment that was conducted
after completion of manufacturing and served as a checkpoint for power-on testing.
The Phase II CARR was conducted after completion of subsystem-level testing and
served as an assessment before the start of integrated systems testing.
The Phase HI CARR was a complete assessment of the spacecraft. The Phase HI
CARR was conducted after completion of integrated systems testing and served to verify
the degree of completion, the customer acceptance, and the degree of readiness for
shipment of the spacecraft to the NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC).
The FRR was a mission readiness assessment. The FRR was conducted after the
test and checkout activities at KSC but before the start of launch countdown.
MI LESTONE REVIEW PROCESS
General Sequence
The sequence of the CSM milestone review process is shown in figure 1. The
CARR plan and the FRR plan provided specific definition of responsibilities and require-
ments for both NASA and contractor personnel. The CARR and FRR plans determined
the review team and board membership; which included contractor personnel, the re-
view team tasks and objectives, the requirements to support review team tasks, and the
action item resolution responsibilities.
The contractors provided the data required for review (appendixes A to E) in Sys-
tem Summary Acceptance Documents (SSAD's), in which the data were sorted and cata-
loged by subsystem and type to facilitate the work of the review teams. Data not
suitable for sorting by subsystem also were provided for the review teams. In addi-
tion, other data were made available to the review team on request.
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Figure 1.- Command and service
module milestone review
sequence.
The responsibility for coordination
and implementation of the CSM reviews was
assigned to the Review Planning Office of
the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC)
(now the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center)
CSM Project Engineering Division. Because
frequent coordination was necessary to de-
termine the most practical time for formal
reviews in support of the CSM milestones,
focal points were established at the NASA
office in Downey, California (NASA-Downey),
and at the CSM prime contractor, North
American Rockwell Corporation (NR),
facility.
Implementing correspondenceestablishing review schedulesand locations, iden-
tifying team andboard members, anddefining data to be reviewed as well as board
presentation requirements was prepared anddistributed at least 2 weeksbefore each
review. (AppendixF is a typical implementing letter. ) Various MSCdivisions support-
ing these reviews were requested to provide a listing of individuals who wouldpartici-
pate in the review. The MSCReviewPlanningOffice screened these lists and included
approved team members on an official visitation list for access to the contractor facil-
ity. This screening process was necessary to ensure appropriate support during the
team reviews.
The review process flow consisted of a 3-day subsystem data review followed by
a 3-day period in which the contractor or other design agency prepared responses to
the problems identified by the review team or special briefings requested by the NASA
program management (or both). The board normally convened the following day to act
on the contractor responses.
Each review team consisted of the subsystem manager (SSM), the reliability and
quality assurance (R&QA) specialist, and the subsystem test engineer (STE). Each
team included a contractor representative to answer on-the-spot questions by the team
members. Individuals from the MSC Flight Safety Office, the MSC Flight Crew Support
Division, and the KSC CSM Engineering Division also supported the team.
The teams reviewed the data presented by the contractor, which included subsys-
tem SSAD books for all applicable subsystems and data in support of these subsystems
that were too bulky to include in the SSAD. Other data required by the review teams in
completing their tasks were also provided on request.
To aid the review team in performing a comprehensive review, brief handouts
that contained descriptions of team tasks and objectives and a detailed description of
the SSAD book sections and supporting data were provided at the review. This infor-
mation was extracted from the CARR and FRR plans as required. The review teams
prepared daily team minutes (figs. 2 and 3) to record their review activities and docu-
mented all significant problems to which the contractor was not able to readily respond
on customer acceptance review item dispositions (CARID' s) (fig. 4) or flight readiness
review item dispositions (FRRID's) (fig. 5).
The CARID's and FRRID's contained the problem description, recommendations
for corrective action, and constraints. Before submittal to the contractor, the CARID's
and FRRID's were serialized and reviewed by the NASA review coordinator for complete-
ness and accuracy. The CARID's and FRRID's then were given to the contractor for
preparation of a written response or position regarding corrective action or other dis-
position of'the problem.
At the conclusion of each subsystem review, the applicable NASA and contractor
SSM, R&QA representative, and STE signed readiness statements (figs. 6 to 9), which
attested that the vehicle was ready to proceed to the next phase of test acceptance or
flight and that all exceptions were identified and documented on CARID's and FRRID' s.
s/c
TEAM TITLE
SUBSYST]_4
NASA TEAM LEADER
NR TEAM LEADER
TEAM MEMBERS
TEAM MINUTES
PHASE CARR
REVIEW TEAM MINUTES DATA
NAM____E ORGANIZATION NAME ORGANIZATION
MINUTES OF MEETING
NR TEAM LEADER NASA TEA/4 LEADER
Figure 2.- The subsystem review team minutes for CARR's.
s/c
TEAM TITLE
SUBSYSTEM
NASA TEAM LEADER
NR TEAM LEADER
TEAM MEMBERS
_A_
TEAM MINUTES
FRR REVIE%4 TEAM MINUTES DATE
ORGANIZATION NAME ORGANIZATION
MINUTES OF MEETING
NR TEAM LEADER NASA TEAM LEADER
Figure 3.- The review team minutes for FRR' s.
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SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
CUSTOMER ACCEPTANCE REVIEW ITEM DISPOSITION (CARID) FORM
Customer's Review Item Definition Sheet
CSM Phase System
YOUR SYSTEM NAME
Initiator Organization
YOUR NAME YOURS
Reference Documentation
DR's, OCP, MR, ICD, etc.
System No. CARID No.
PER CARR PLAN LEAVE BLANK
Phone No.
YOURS
Date
TODAY
Pat No.
SHORT PHRASE DESCRIBING PROBLem4
PROBLEM (Title)
COMPLETE DESCRIPTION
RECOMMENDED ACTIONJUSTIFICATION
BE SPECIFIC WITH LOGIC
RECOMMENDED CONSTRAINT BE SPECIFIC
CONTRACTOR RESOLUTION (SUMMARY)
LEAVE BLANK
Board Comments/Remarks/Direction
I=V_,AVE B I.dLNK
Action Required to Close CARID
Board Decision Summary (To be filled in by the Board or Pre-Board)
Approved: Action:
Mandatory this SC CAT. I [] Contractor []
Mandatory SC Subs CAT. II [] NASA []
Study & Submit ECP CAT. III []
Closed-No Action Req'd CAT. IV []
Disapproved Withdrawn CAT. V [] HARDWARE []
Other (Specify) BLANK CAT. VI [] SOFTWARE []
NASA Board Chairman Signature _ Date
Const;3int:
Subsystems Test []
Combined Sys. Test []
Integrated Test
Acceptance ,_
Other _ BLANK
None
Figure 4.- The CARID.
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FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW ITEM DISPOSITION (FRRID)
Customer's Review Item Definition Sheet
S/C SYSTEM
The one under Your system
review
INITIATOR
Your name and phone number
SYSTEM NUMBER
From FRR
Plan
I ORGANIZA+ION
Yours
FRRID NUMBER
Assigned by
Control
DATE
Todays
REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION PART NUMBER
(DR's, PAR's, IPL, Vol. I, etc.) Be specific
PROBLEM Short description of problem
(TITLE)
Complete description
RECOMMENDED ACTION/JUSTIFICATION
Recommend action with logic given
RECOMMENDED CONSTRAINT
Specific constraint
PRE-BOARD COMMENTs/ REMARKS/DIRECTION
Do not use
ACTION REQUIRED TO CLOSE FRRID
[] REFER TO BOARD [] DISPOSITIONED
(See Decision Summary)
BOARD COMMENTS/REMARKS/DIRECTION
Do not use
ACTION REQUIRED TO CLOSE FRRID
DECISION SUMMARY (To be filled in by the Board or Pre-Board)
D ACTION D CONTRACTOR [] NASA
Approved:
[] MANDATORY THIS S/C CAT. I
[3 MANDATORY S/C SUBS CAT. II
[] STUDY & SUBMIT ECP CAT. III
D CLOSED- NO ACTION REQ'D OAT. IV
[] DISAPPROVED CAT. V
[] OTHER (Specify) CAT. VI
3 HARDWARE
[] Constraint:
CDDT
[] FRT
.-] LAUNCH
3 MISSION
D OTHER
[] SOFTWARE
[] Yes No
SIGNATURE OF NASA BOARD CHAIRMAN DATE
MSC FORM 2089A (REV JAN 68)
(a) The problem definition sheet.
Figure 5.- The FRRID.
7
FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW ITEM DISPOSITIOH (FRRID)
Contractor's Review Item Resolution Sheet
S/C
ORIGINATOR
SYSTEM SYSTEM NUMBER FRRID NUMBER
DEPT, DATE
REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION
PROBLEM TITLE
RESOLUTION/ACTION TO BE TAKEN (USE CONTINUATION SHEETS AS REQUIRED)
USE AS REQUIRED
AUTHORIZED NAA REPRESENTATIVE
MSC FORM 2089B (AUG 67)
(b) The problem resolution sheet.
Figure 5.- Continued.
DATE
N ASA - MSC
S/C
FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW ITEM DISPOSITION (FRRID)
Continuation Sheet
SYSTEM SYSTEM NUMBER FRRID NUMBER
NASA [] NAA CONTINUATION DATE
PROBLEM TITLE
USE AS REQUIRED
MSC FORM 208gc (AUG 67)
(c) The continuationsheet.
Figure 5.- Concluded.
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NASA READINESS STATEMENT
CSM READINESS STATEMENT
Subsystem Number (SSAD Book)
The NASA-MSC Subsystem Manager, and the MSC Reliability and Quality
Assurance Office and the NASA-Downey Subsystem Test Engineer have
assessed the readiness of the
Subsystem as of
(Date)
based upon applicable NASA/NR specifications and NASA requirements and
upon reviews conducted in accordance with the current, applicable NASA
CARR Plan, and have determined this subsystem to be in a condition of
readiness for
( ) Initiation of subsystem test
( ) Acceptance
with the exceptions of (a) open items known to be documented against this
subsystem, and (b) those open CARID's identified below.
Open CARID's
NASA-Downey Subsystem Test Date
Engineer
NASA-_C Subsystem Manager Date _C Reliability and Quality Date
Assurance
Figure 6.- The NASA readiness statement for CARR' s.
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NR READINESS STATEMENT
CSM READINESS STATEMENT
TEAM NUMBER
North American Rockwell Corporation Representatives have assessed
the readiness of the as of
(System or Other) (Date)
based upon applicable NASA/NR specifications and NASA requirements
and upon reviews conducted in accordance with the current, applicable
NASA CARR Plan, and have determined this subsystem to be in a condition
of readiness for
( ) Initiation of subsystem test
( ) Acceptance
with the exception of the open items included in the SSAD.
NR Engineering Date NR Quality Assurance Date
NR Reliability Date NR Test and Operations (_ III)Date
NR Manufacturing (_I)
NR Assistant Program
Manager
Date
Figure 7.- The contractor readiness statement for CARR's.
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NASA READINESS STATEMENT
CSM READINESS STATEMENT
Team Number
The NASA-M_SC Subsystem Manager and the b_SC Reliability and Quality
Assurance Office have assessed the readiness of the
Subsystem as of
(Date)
based upon applicable NASA/NR specifications and NASA requirements
and upon reviews conducted in accordance with the current, applicable
NASA FRR Plan, and have determined this subsystem to be in a condition
of readiness for launch with the exceptions of (a) open items known to
be documented against the CSM, and (b) those open FRRID's identified
below.
Open FRRID's
NASA-MSC Subsystem Manager Date MSC R&QA Representative Date
Figure 8.- The NASA readiness statement for FRR's.
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NR READINESS STATEMENT
CSM READINESS STATEMENT
TEAM NU_IBER
North American Rockwell Corporation Representatives have assessed the
readiness off the as off
(System or Other) (Date)
based upon applicable NASA/NR specifications and NASA requirements and
upon reviews conducted in accordance with the current, applicable NASA
FRR Plan, and have determined that, except for known items documented
against this system, it is in a condition of readiness for launch.
NR Engineering Date NR Quality Assurance Date
NR Reliability Date NR Test and Operations Date
Figure 9.- The contractor readiness statement for FRR' s.
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The CARID's and FRRID's and any other items of special interest were presented
to the CARR and FRR Boards for review and disposition. (/%typical CARID is in appen-
dix G. ) The CARR and FRR Boards were chaired by the Manager, Apollo Spacecraft
Program, with senior NASA management members representing the various NASA
Center directorates or offices. The contractor provided individuals from the compa-
rable levels of management for discussion of the problem and for acceptance of actions.
Minutes of the board meeting were written to document significant discussions, agree-
ments, and action. (For minutes of a typical CARR Board meeting, see appendix H. )
A tracking system was established for closeout of these action items, and reports
were prepared at various intervals to document the closure status of these actions.
This system was implemented by the NASA and contractor review coordinators. (Typ-
ical closeout documentation is contained in appendix G. )
Customer Acceptance Readiness Review Plan
The purpose of the CSM CARR was to evaluate the CSM, the spacecraft/lunar
module adapter (SLA), and other related items for assessing the readiness to start in-
tegrated testing of individual subsystems and to ship to KSC. The review objective was
to define any action required to bring the CSM and the SLA to a condition of readiness
for testing or acceptance for delivery (or both).
The Phase I CARR was conducted immediately before the start of installed sub-
system checkout of the stacked CSM to identify constraints to subsystem tests. The
Phase II CARR was conducted immediately before the start of CSM integrated check-
out at the CSM prime contractor facility in Downey, California (NR-Downey), to identify
constraints to integrated checkout. The Phase HI CARR was conducted immediately be-
fore shipment to identify constraints to acceptance and shipment. If the Earth landing
system (ELS) was not complete at the time of the Phase HI CARR, it became the subject
of a separate (delta) Phase HI CARR.
Procedures and implementation. - Information on data requirements, scheduling,
activities, reviews, composition of teams, and team tasks and other considerations
necessary for implementing the CARR plan are presented in the following paragraphs.
Data and documentation: The primary data and documentation required for the
CARR's were the SSAD's listed in table I. (For SSAD contents, see appendix A. ) Sup-
porting data are described in appendix B.
The NASA associate contractors were responsible for the preparation of data in
support of the guidance and navigation (G&N) equipment and the acceptance checkout
equipment (ACE). Data requirements were specified by a separate directive. The
G&N and ACE data were forwarded to NR at least 1 day before the start of the subsys-
tem team review.
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TABLE I. - SYSTEM SUMMARY ACCEPTANCE DOCUMENTS FOR CARR
!
Book no.
I Subsystem or category
Launch escape system
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.8
Structures (includes boost protective cover)
Ordnance
Mechanical (includes canard)
Electrical power (includes wiring)
Command module
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
2.10
2.11
2.12
2.13
2.14
2.15
2.16
2.17
Structures (excludes thermal protection)
Ordnance
Mechanical (includes docking)
Experiments a
Environmental control
Reaction control
Instrumentation
Electrical power (includes wiring)
Entry monitor
Stabilization and control (includes orbital rate drive, Earth
and lunar (ORDEAL))
Communications
Sequential
Crew equipment, couches, and stowage
Displays and controls
Guidance and navigation (G&N) (NR interface data only)b
Earth recovery
Heat shields
a'Data and documentation related to the scientific instrument module, excluding
Government-furnished equipment (GFE), were contained in the applicable SSAD (e. g.,
Structures, Instrumentation, etc.).
bAssociate contractors prepared separate documentation.
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TABLE I. - SYSTEM SUMMARY ACCEPTANCE DOCUMENTS FOR CARR - Continued
I
Book no. I Subsystem or category
Service module
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.q
3.8
3.11
3.12
3.18
3.19
3.20
3.21
Structures (includes thermal protection)
Ordnance
Mechanical
Experiments a
Environmental control
Reaction control
Instrumentation
Electrical power (includeswiring)
Communications
Sequential
Service propulsion (includes launch escape system (LES)
motors)
Cryogenics
Fuel cells
Radar
SLA c
6.1
6.3
6.4
6.7
6.8
6.12
Structures
Mechanical and ordnance (separation)
Experiments a (if applicable)
Instrumentation (if applicable)
Electrical power
Sequential
aData and documentation related to the scientific instrument module, excluding
GFE, were contained in the applicable SSAD (e. g., Structures, Instrumentation, etc. ).
CThe SLA CARR was conducted in one phase only.
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TABLE I.- SYSTEM SUMMARY ACCEPTANCE DOCUMENTS FOR CARR - Concluded
[
Book
no. 1 Subsystem or category
Total CSM
4.34 l General (includes combined and integrated tests)
d
Miscellaneous
5.24
5.27
5.28
5.29
5.31
5.32
5.33
Acceptance checkout equipment (ACE)
Pressure vessels
Nonmetallic materialse
Safety
Configuration
Thermal control
Quality assurance
dsections were set up for CARID numbering but did not require separate SSAD
books.
eA data book was prepared but did not conform to the standard SSAD format.
The CSM contractor furnished data packages for hardware built by the lunar mod-
ule (LM) prime contractor but installed in the CSM. These data covered the history of
the hardware after its receipt from the LM prime contractor. These data were pro-
vided at the Phase HI CARR only and were related to the following hardware.
Component
Antenna kit
Transponder
Waveguide
Adapter
Seven-digit timer
Part no.
LDW 370-21007 (or equivalent)
LSC 370- 500- 3 (or equivalent)
LSC 370-203-101 (or equivalent)
LSC 370-203-110 (or equivalent)
LSC 350-31200-01 (or equivalent)
Data schedules for the Phase I, II, and III CARR's were established jointly by NASA-
Downey, the NR CARR coordinator, and the MSC Review Planning Office.
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The CARID workbook was used as the working document to report and expedite the
CARR Board action items. The CARl]:) workbook was published by NR and contained the
CARID actions and responses at the time of the CARR Board meeting. Distribution was
limited to the NR and NASA CARR coordinators for use as required in the closeout of
CARID's. The minutes of the CARR Board meetings, including summaries of the
CARID's, were distributed by MSC to all offices and organizations having a working
interest in the CSM.
Pre-CARR activities: The SSAD data were prepared by the contractor on a pro-
gressive basis concurrently with the manufacturing and checkout of the subsystem. The
NASA-Downey office participated with NR in the review of the SSAD's to ensure that
they were adequate to support the formal review.
In accordance with current proceduresp NASA R&QA reviewedp in real time, all
closed disposition record (DR) squawk sheets, material review disposition records
(DR-MR's), DR failures, and DR unsatisfactory conditions. Issues from this review
were resolved in real time or presented to the board as an open, unsatisfactory condition.
In accordance with current procedures, MSC reviewed (at NR-Tulsa, Oklahoma)
all SLA repairs resulting from material-review dispositions approximately 2 weeks be-
fore acceptance. A report of the review was prepared by NR and submitted to MSC.
This report was made available at the formal CARR for reference only. Issues covered
by this report were reopened at the formal CARR only if new information was available
or if the MSC SLA project engineer approved (or both).
Formal reviews: Approximately 1 week before the CARR Board meeting, a for-
mal review of SSAD's and supplemental data was conducted at NR-Downey by the sub-
system review teams listed in table II. The review teams were structured as defined
in the following paragraph. The formal reviews lasted approximately 3 days and were
audits of the data provided in accordance with the team tasks enumerated on the follow-
ing pages. Approximately 2 weeks following acceptance of the SLA, a formal review
of SLA-SSAD and supplemental data was conducted at an MSC-designated location by
the SLA subsystem review team described in the following paragraph. The review
lasted approximately 2 days, and all issues resulting from this review were presented
to the chief of the MSC CSM Project Engineering Division for disposition.
Subsystem review teams: The subsystem review teams were composed of the
following members.
1. MSC SSM (team leader)
2. NASA P,&QA representative (MSC or NASA-Downey)
3. NASA-Downey STE
4. NR systems engineer
5. KSC systems test engineer (as available)
18
TABLE II.- SUBSYSTEM REVIEW TEAM TASKS FOR CARR
Tasks
1. Compare the parts serialization
list with the latest parts list
(Phase I, delta for Phase HI).
2. Review and compare supplier data
with part and serial number
(SIN) list. Audit data pack-
ages for acceptability (Phase I,
delta for Phase HI).
3. Audit applicable parts of the
operating time/cycle and sheu-
life record as specified in
specifications MA0201-0077 and
MA0201°5695 for adequate re-
maining time (phases I and HI).
4. Ensure that open engineering
orders (EO's) are identified to
the proper constraint in the
open item status report (OISR)
(Phases I and HI).
5. Review unreleased engineering
data for constraints or retest
requirements (phases I and HI).
6. Compare S/N's taken from actual
hardware in the CSM with the
S/N's in the serialized parts
record (Phase I).
7. Audit F.O's resulting from failures
for actual spacecraft implemen-
tation (Phases I and III).
8. Reviewwaivers and deviations for
acceptability (Phase I, delta
for Phase HI).
9. Verify that all effective EO's
have been planned or incorpo-
rated (Phase I, delta for
Phase HI).
10. Ensure that proper corrective
action has been taken as the
result of unsatisfactory re-
ports (UR's) specifically re-
lated to the vehicle under
review (Phase I, delta for
Phase HI).
11. Ensure that all items requiring
fit check at Downey have been
fit checked or are scheduled to
be fit checked (Phase III).
SSAD
sections
3, 6
24
Supplemental data
Irregular parts list
(IPL) configuration
index
Acceptance data package
Supplier data listing
Specification MA0201-
0077
Specification MA0201-
Responsibility
(a)
SSM/STE
(1)
(1)
(1)
5695
15 OISR
8 None
(1)
(1)
7, 8, 15
7, 8, 15
2O
12
S/N's supplied by NASA-
Downey CMO
Program failure tape
OISR
Configuration veri-
fication record
(CVR)
None
Engineering Order Ac-
countability System
(EOAS)
OISR
Historical product plan
None
OISR
Closed fabrication and
inspection record
Closed test and in-
spection record
(TAm)
(1)
(1)
(1)
b(2)
(1)
R&QA
(z)
(2)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(1)
(2)
a(1) indicates prime responsibility; (2) indicates support responsibility.
bconfiguration Management Board prime responsibility.
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.TABLE II. - SUBSYSTEM REVIEW TEAM TASKS FOR CARR - Concluded
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
Tasks
Review material summary accept-
ance document (MSAD) for
acceptance of material
(Phase HI).
Ensure that retest requirements
have been defined for modifica-
tions performed alter integrated
test (Phase HI).
Ensure that hardware reuse evalu-
ations (HRE's) have been ap-
proved for previously flown
equipment (Phases I and III).
Review open DR's and open DR-
MR's for proper constraint in
OISR (Phases I and HI).
Audit OISR, temporary installation
record (THI), and removal sheets
to verify that constraints are
properly identified (Phases I
and HI).
Review completed Downey checkout
specifications, test preparation
sheets (TPS's), test variances,
and DR's for compliance with
Part IIspecification (Phase III).
Identify unexplained anomalies on a
CARID for CARR Board
information.
Review open CARID's and attempt
to close out (Phase HI).
Audit instrumentation listing.
Review closed DRts and closed
material reviews (MR's) for
compliance with applicable
specifications.
Identify (on a CARID for the CARR
Board) any mishap or accident
related to a closed or open DR. d
Review IPL (electrical, electronic,
and electromagnetic (EEE) parts)
for acceptability.
SSAD
sections
None
36
40
13, 14
9, 11
4, 26, 29
All
37
None
18, 19
18, 19
None
Supplemental data
Nonmetallic materials
summary acceptance
document
Recap and movement au-
thorization (RAMA)
report
Supplier data packages
OISR
OISR
TIR
RAMA report
Part II specification
Process specification
Unexplained anomaly
TAIR book
None
Instrumentation equipment
list (SID 67-570)
None
None
None
Responsibility
(a)
,i i
SSM/STE R&QA
c(i) (2)
(i) (2)
(2) (1)
(1) (2)
(1) --
(1) --
(2) (2)
(1) --
(I) (2)
(2) (I)
(2) (l)
a(1) indicates prime responsibility; (2) indicates support responsibility.
cASPO systems engineer prime responsibility.
dNR systems engineers actively supported the SSM, the STE, and the R&QA representative in accom-
plishing this task.
2O
Special teams: "Specialworking teams were established to review items of spe-
cial consideration such as tanks, nonmetallic materials, wiring, and ACE.
Members-at-large: The following individualswere designated as subsystem re-
view team members-at-large.
1. Members-at-large from NASA
a. NASA-Downey vehicle manager
b. Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (ASPO) project engineer
c. NASA R&QA representative (MSC or NASA-Downey)
d. NASA-Downey configuration management representative
e. MSC safety representative
2. Members-at-large from NR
a. Reliabilityrepresentative
b. Quality representative
c. Manufacturing representative
d. Quality information representative
e. Apollo Test Operations representative
f. Configuration Management Office (CMO) representative
g. Safety representative
The members-at-large or their designated representatives attended all sessions and
were available for consultation to all subsystem review teams. The members-at-large
ensured that allprogram anomalies and hardware problems applicable to the spacecraft
under consideration thatwere known to them were considered for CARID' s.
Review team tasks: The CARR team review objectives were met by performing
the team tasks outlined in table II.
Team minutes: Team minutes were submitted to the CARR secretariat daily.
The minutes included the team accomplishments, the CARID's submitted, and other
significantinformation as a permanent record of the team activities. The team leader
was responsible for the preparation of the team minutes (fig.2).
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Use of CARID's: The CARID's were used to identify specific problems by citing
part number, reference documentation, and a brief summary of how the problem was
identified. In the CAP/D, a specific action was recommended to solve the problem and
a specific constraint that included the logic for arriving at the constraint was given.
Immediately following data review cut-off time, the NASA-Downey engineer and the
ASPO project engineer for the designated vehicle convened a meeting to ensure that
the specified criteria had been met. The CARID's were also prepared for each un-
explained anomaly by the MSC SSM for presentation to the CARR Board.
Design review or product improvement items or items that affected mission rules
were handled through program (Configuration Control Panel (CCP) or Configuration
Control Board (CCB)) channels rather than through CARID_s. No CARIDts were to be
written for planned work (including open DR' s) unless the schedule for completion of the
planned work would not support the overall schedule of events. No CARID's were to be
written on open certifications and open failures because the contractor normally pre-
sented data on these subjects to the CARR Board. The CARID's were submitted as soon
as they were written to give the contractor the maximum allowable time to respond, and
CAP/D's submitted after the deadline announced at the CARR were not to be processed.
The contractor was allowed 3 working days before the CARR Board meeting to prepare
responses to the CAP/D.
The NASA-NR CARR coordinator team: The NASA-NR CARR coordinator team
consisted of the Chief, MSC Review Planning Office, the MSC CSM Project Engineering
Division representative, the NASA-Downey representative, and the NR Project
Engineering Division representative. This team was responsible for the following.
1. Establishing a CARR control station
2. Reviewing CARID's and advising team members in the preparation of CARID's
3. Reviewing and coordinating CAP/D resolutions
4. Serving as the CARR Board secretariat
5. Preparing and publishing the CAP/D workbook and the minutes
The NASA preboard (Phase III CARR only): The NASA preboard reviewed the
items presented on CARID's and established the agenda items for the Phase HI CARR
Board. The CARR Board members designated representatives from their respective
offices to serve as preboard members. The contractor provided personnel of sufficient
authority to accept CARID action items.
Postreview closeout activities: The apulicable SSM and the R&QA systems engi-
neer review teams evaluated contractor resolutions and recommended approval or dis-
approval of closeout actions in a timely manner. Final approval or disapproval was by
the CARR Board chairman. This activity was coordinated by the MSC Review Planning
Office.
Delta CARR for ELS. - A special data review of the ELS was conducted by desig-
nated representatives of the MSC Engineering and Development Directorate and repre-
sentatives of the MSC R&QA Office. The ELS CARR Board was chaired by the Manager
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for the Command and Service Modules, Apollo Spacecraft Program. Members of the
board and of the review team were designated by implementation letter for each CSM.
The applicable portions of the CARR plan were followed in the conduct of this review.
The CARR Board.- The CARR Board reviewed the items presented in CARID's
and briefings and determined the action required to bring the spacecraft to a conditio_
of readiness for testing or acceptance (or both). Support from NR complemented the
NASA membership.
Organization of the Phase I and Phase II CARR Boards consisted of the following.
1. Chairman m Manager for the Command and Service Modules, Apollo Space-
craft Program, MSC
2. Members
a. Chief, CSM Project Engineering Division, MSC
b. R&QA representative, MSC or NASA-Downey
c. Engineering and Development Directorate representative, MSC
d. Project Engineering representative, NASA-Downey
e. Test Engineering Office representative, NASA-Downey
f. Manager, NASA-Downey
g. Safety Office representative, NASA-Downey
3. Secretariat-- CSM Project Engineering Division representative, MSC
Organization of the Phase III CARR Board consisted of the following.
1. Chairman-- Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program, MSC
2. Members
a. Assistant Program Manager for Flight Safety, ASPO, MSC
b. Director of Engineering and Development, MSC
c. Director of Flight Crew Operations, MSC
d. Director of Flight Operations, MSC
e. Director of Medical Research and Operations, MSC
f. Manager of Safety Office and R&QA Office, MSC
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g. Manager, NASA-Downey
h. Director of Scienceand Applications, MSC
i. Manager, Command and Service Modules
3. Secretariat -- CSM Project Engineering Division representative, MSC
The following were invited to attend the CARR Board meetings.
1. Director of Launch Operations, KSC
2. Manager, Resident Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (RASPO), KSC
3. Director, Apollo Program Office, KSC
4. Director of Spacecraft Operations, KSC
5. Director, Apollo Program, NASA Headquarters
6. Mission Director, Apollo Program, NASA Headquarters
Meetings: Meetings of the CARR Boards consisted primarily of presentations by
NR and NASA. The presentations included the NASA and NR readiness status and a
summary of results of the subsystem team reviews (CARID's). The SSM, his designee,
or the originator presented the CARID's at the CARR Board meetings. At Phase III
CARR Board meetings, the contractor presented the information shown in appendix I.
Minutes: The NASA-NR CARR Board secretariat prepared the minutes of the
CARR Board meetings (appendix H). The minutes were based on briefings, CARID's,
CARID responses, and board direction and were submitted to the CARR Board chair-
man for approval.
Action items: The NASA-NR CARR Board secretariat recorded the board action
items and made them available to the CARR Board chairman for approval. Each action
item was annotated on the CARID under consideration. The CARID's written on anom-
alies and closed by the CARR Board authorized the NASA R&QA Office to close the ap-
plicable open DR's from this anomaly. Those action items that were considered to be
constraints to further testing or to shipment of a later vehicle were closed by generating
a "program action" CARID against that later vehicle for submittal and disposition at,
or before, the CARR or FRR for that vehicle. The preparation of the program action
CARID authorized closure of the action against the specific vehicle under review but
ensured that the action was pursued for subsequent vehicles. The CARR Board pro-
ceedings were tape recorded and impounded by NR as a permanent record to permit
review at a later time by the secretariat.
Action item resolution: The Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program, MSC (or his
designee), was responsible for determining when action had been taken to resolve the
action items resulting from the CARR Board meetings. Constraints to further testing
or shipment defined by the CARR Boards were considered removed only by this defini-
tion of action item resolution.
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Status report of action items: The contractor provided a monthly status report
of all open CARID's to MSC. The monthly status report included the following
information.
1. The CARID number
2. The action abstract
3. The reference closeout documentation
The first monthly report by NR was made within 10 days following the CARR Board
meeting and offered closeout actions on all items constraining the next test phase or ac-
ceptance. This report was submitted to the Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program, MSC.
Subsequent reports were grouped with reports from CARR's for other vehicles. Also,
NR submitted closeout proposals for all open CARID's and action items to MSC in real
time.
Contractor logisticsupport: In addition to the logisticsupport defined in the pre-
ceding sections of the CARR plan, the contractor provided secretarial, reproduction,
and data retrieval services required to support the various CARR activities. The work-
books for the Phase I and Phase IICARR' s included the CARID's and the CARID re-
sponses. Twenty copies were provided by NR for the CARR Board meeting. The
workbooks for the Phase IH CARR included the CARID's, the CARID responses, and
special briefings. Forty copies were provided by NR for the CARR Board meeting.
Environmental control system and crew compartment fit and function KSC data
review.- Special environmental control system (Ecs) and crew compartment fit and
function (CCFF) data reviews were held at KSC after the Altitude Chamber Test to en-
sure that the ECS was acceptable for flight. The data review did not constrain CSM
acceptability for delivery. The applicable sections of the SSAD were updated, and the
necessary supporting data were provided for this review. The requirements for these
reviews are contained in the CSM FRR plan.
Flight Readiness Review Plan
The FRR was conducted at KSC and MSC. The FRR data reviews were held at
KSC, and the NASA preboards and FRR Boards met at MSC. The purpose of the FRR
was to evaluate the CSM, the SLA, the ground-support equipment (GSE), and other re-
lated items for assessing their readiness to support the launch and designated mission.
The review objectives were to define any action required to bring the CSM and the SLA
to a condition of flight readiness and to bring the GSE to a condition of CSM launch sup-
port readiness. The scope of the FRR was limited to the information developed on the
CSM, the SLA, and related items subsequent to (i. e., delta data from) the Phase HI
CARR of the specific vehicle under review.
Procedures and implementation.- Information on data requirements, scheduling,
activities,reviews, composition of teams, and team tasks and other considerations
necessary for implementing the FRR plan are presented in the following paragraphs.
Data and documentation: Spacecraft data were assembled and sorted by subsys-
tem as described in table IH. The detailed content of each SSAD was as described
25
in appendix C. The SSAD contained data accumulated subsequent to data cut-off for the
Phase HI CARR unless specifically noted otherwise. The SSAD was prepared on a pro-
gressive basis concurrently with the spacecraft checkout.
TABLE HI. - SYSTEM SUMMARY ACCEPTANCE
DOCUMENTS FOR FRR
Book no. Subsystem or category
Launch escape system
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.8
Structures (includes boost protective cover)
Ordnance
Mechanical (includes canard)
Electrical power (includes wiring)
Command module
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2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
2.10
2.11
2.12
2.13
2.14
2.15
2.16
2.17
Structures (excludes thermal protection)
Ordnance
Mechanical (includes docking)
Experiments
Environmental control
Reaction control
Instrumentation
Electrical power (includes wiring)
Entry monitor
Stabilization and control (includes ORDEAL)
Communications
Sequential
Crew equtpmentp couches, and stowage
Displays and controls
G&N (NR interface data only) a
Earth recovery
Heat shields
aAssoctate contractors prepared separate documentation.
TABLE HI.- SYSTEMSUMMARYACCEPTANCE
DOCUMENTSFORFRR - Continued
/
Book
no. [ Subsystem or category
Service module
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.11
3.12
3.18
3.19
3.20
3.21
Structures (includes thermal protection)
Ordnance
Mechanical
Experiments
Environmental control
Reaction control
Instrumentation
Electrical power (includes wiring)
Communications
Sequential
Service propulsion (includes LES motors)
Cryogenics
Fuel cells
Radar
SLA
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.8
6.12
Structures
Ordnance
Mechanical
Electrical power
Sequential
Total CSM
4.34 ] General (includes combined and integrated
1 tests)
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TABLE III. SYSTEM SUMMARY ACCEPTANCE
DOCUMENTS FOR FRR- Concluded
!
Book
.o 1 Subsystem or category
Miscellaneous b
5.23
5.24
5.25
5.26
5.27
5.28
5.29
5.30
5.31
5.33
Ground- support equipment (GSE)
ACE
GFE
Plumbing
Pressure vessels
Nonmetallic materials c
Safety
Crew stations
Configuration
Quality assurance
bsections were set up for FRRID numbering but did not require
SSAD books.
cA data book was prepared but did not conform to the standard
SSAD format.
In addition to SSAD data, supplemental data were provided. The supplemental
data were existing data that were unsuitable for sorting by subsystem. Supplemental
data requirements are defined in appendixes D and E. The NASA associate contractors
prepared that portion of the data for which they were responsible and submitted their
inputs through NASA-Downey to KSC for inclusion in the data package.
The MSC was responsible for the preparation of the SSAD and of supplemental
data involving all Government-furnished equipment (GFE). The equipment managers
were responsible for the preparation of these inputs and for submission through the
GFE Office, MSC, for inclusion into the GFE data package in accordance with applicable
procedures. The GFE data were forwarded to RASPO-KSC 1 week before the start of
the team reviews.
All problems identified by the data review teams were documented on FRRID's.
An FRRID (fig. 5) was a two-part form that allowed NASA to document problems in a
uniform format and the contractor to provide an answer in the corresponding uniform
manner. The FRRID's were assigned control numbers to facilitate communications on
specific problems.
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An FRRIDworkbookwas prepared by the contractor for presentation to the MSC
preboard. The workbook containedcopies of the NASAproblem definition sheets, the
contractor resolution sheets, and any supporting data relative to the FRRID.
Thirty-five copies of the FRRID workbookwere required to support the MSCpreboard
meeting.
An FRRIDworkbookalso wasprepared for presentation to the MSC FRR Board.
The workbook containedFRRID's that were presented to the FRR Board for disposition
or information and waspublishedby NASA. Fifty copies were required. The contractor
was permitted to publish a preliminary issue of the FRRID workbook for use at his in-
housereview.
Presentations of FRRID's and special briefings for the MSCpreboard and the FRR
Board were by meansof film transparencies (view graphs). The contractor provided
two copies of eachview graph. Two hard copies of eachview graph were prepared by
the contractor in support of the preboard meeting. After mutual determination of the
FRRID's and special briefings to be presented to the FRR Board, a final briefing was
prepared. Support for preparation of the view graphs was provided to the contractor
by NASA, who published 50 copies of the contractor's briefing material to be handed
out at the FRR Board meeting. This handout constituted the FRR report. Schedules
for data and documentation were established jointly by KSC, MSC, and the contractor.
Pre-FRR activities: Following the Altitude Chamber Test, a special review was
convened by the Manager, RASPO-KSC, to assess the acceptance of the ECS and the re-
suits of the CCFF Test conducted during the Ambient Chamber Test. The review was
scheduled to start within 5 days following the completion of the Altitude Chamber Test.
Exact dates were coordinated with the contractor by RASPO-KSC, and implementing
correspondence was originated by the MSC Review Planning Office. The contractor
provided data in accordance with SSAD content requirements for the ECS and the crew
equipment subsystem, with applicable backup data available on request.
The ECS review team was composed of the following individuals. (Subsystem re-
view team tasks are shown in table IV. )
1. MSC SSM
2. MSC reliability systems engineer
3. MSC Flight Crew Support Division representative
4. NR-Launch Operations (LO) systems engineer
5. KSC systems engineer (as available)
6. MSC Safety Office representative
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TABLE IV. - SUBSYSTEM REVIEW TEAM TASKS FOR FRR
Tasks
1. Compare the parts serialization list
with the latest parts list.
2. Audit, review, and compare supplier
data with part and S/N list; also
audit data packages for accepta-
bility (delta from Phase IT[ CARR).
3. Audit applicable parts of the operating
tlme/cycie and shelf-life record as
specified in specifications
MA0201-0077 and MA0201-5695,
for adequate remaining time
(including one scrub and recycle).
4. Ensure that open EO's are identified
to the proper constraint in the
operation page and line schedule
(OPLS).
5. Review unreleased engineering data
for constraints or retest
requirements.
6. Audit EO's, including those resulting
from program failures, for actual
spacecraft implementation.
7. Review waivers and deviations for
acceptability (delta from
Phase HI CARR).
8. Ensure that proper corrective action
has been taken as the result of
UR's specifically related to the
vehicle under review and limited
to those UR's not yet reviewed at
MSC (delta from Phase HI CARR).
9. Identify flight readiness spares
for shortages and limited life.
10. Ensure that retest requirements have
been defined for modifications
performed or planned after inte-
grated test (test checkout
procedure (TCP) 0005).
11. Ensure that HRE's have been approved
for previously flown equipment
(delta from Phase HI CAP.R).
SSAD
sections
3, 6
6
24
15
7, 8, 15
5, 12
20
34
36
40
Supplemental data
IPL configuration index
Acceptance data package
Supplier data listing
Specification MA0201-0077
Specification MA0201-5695
Limited life tabulation
run, by spacecraft
CVR
OPLS
None
ResPonsibility
(a)
SSM m_c_a
(1) (2)
(t) (z)
(1) (2)
(1) --
(I) --
CVR (1) (2)
OPLS
EOAS
Test and Checkout (1) (2)
Requirements Document
(TCRD)
Test Specification and
Criteria Document
(TSCD)
Part II specification
Specification change notices
None (2) (1)
Flight-critical spares
shortage list tabulation
run, by spacecraft
number
OPLS
Supplier data packages
a(1) denotes prime responsibility; (2) denotes support responsibility.
(1) --
(1) (2)
(2) (1)
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TABLE IV. - SUBSYSTEM REVIEW TEAM TASKS FOR FRR ° Concluded
Tasks
12. Review OPLS, TIR, and removal
sheets to verify that constraints
are properly identified (delta from
Phase IT[ CARR).
13. Review TCP's, TPS's, interim dispo-
sition records (IDR's), DR's, and
deviations for compliance with
TSCD and TCRD.
14. Review open CARID's and take action
to close out.
15. Audit instrumentation listingto
ensure compliance with instru-
mentation specifications(delta
from Phase l_ CARR).
16. Review MSAD for acceptance Of
material changes made at KSC
(delta from Phase III CARR).
17. Review open DR's for proper con°
straint in OPLS (delta from
Phase IT[ CARR).
18. Ensure that closed DR°MR's are
supported by proper engineering
analysi s .
19. Review IDR's and DR's for
unexplained anomalies at KSC,
and identifyby subsystem on
FRRID's (mandatory).
20. Review firstflightcomponents for
excessive open and closed DR's.
21. Review pressure vessel data for
contract compliance.
22. Review closed DR's and MR's for
acceptability.
23. Record (on FRRID for the FRR Board)
any significant mishap or
accident that resulted in a DR
(whether closed or open).
24. Review IPL (EEE parts) for
acceptability.
SSAD
sections
9, 10, 11
26, 27
28, 29
37
None
None
13, 14,
18, 19
14, 19
13, 18
26, 27
13, 14,
18, 19
34
None
18, 19
13, 14,
18, 19
None
Supplemental data
TIR
OPLS
TSCD
TCRD
Test Checkout Operational
Plan (TCOP)
Part II specification
None
Master measurement list
MSAD
OPLS
None
List of unexplained
anomalies
IDR's by request
None
Fracture mechanics
summary and pressure
vessel data
None
None
None
a(1)dsnotem prime responsibility;(2) denotes support responsibility.
Responsibility
(a)
SSM R&QA
(1) (2)
(I) --
(2) (2)
(1) (2)
(1) (2)
(1) (2)
(2) (1)
(1) (2)
(2) (1)
(1) (2)
(1) (l)
(2) (1)
(2) (1)
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The CCFF review team was composedof the following individuals.
1. MSC SSM (crew equipment)
2. MSC Systems Engineering Division representative (crew station)
3. MSC GFE Office representative
4. MSC Crew Systems Division representative
5. MSC Flight Crew Support Division Representative
6. MSC R&Q_ representative
7. NR-LO systems engineer
8. KSC systems engineer (as available)
9. MSC Safety Office representative
The organization of the ECS-CCFF review board was as follows.
I. Chairman -- Manager, RASPO-KSC
2. Members
a. CSM Project Engineering Division representative, MSC
b. Systems Engineering Division representative, MSC
c. Safety and R&QA representative, MSC
d. Flight Crew Operations Directorate representative, MSC
e. Engineering and Development Directorate representative, MSC
f. Test Division representative, MSC
g. Project Engineer, RASPO-KSC
h. Spacecraft Operations Directorate representative, KSC
3. Secretariat -- CSM Project Engineering Division representative, MSC
Approximately I week after the spacecraft was transferred to the KSC Vehicle As-
sembly Building, a special pre-FRR meeting was conducted to review the readiness of the
GSE to support prelaunch activity. This meeting was scheduled jointly by MSC, KSC,
and RASPO-KSC. The GSE review team tasks are shown in table V. The contractor pro-
vided data as outlined in apperdix E and personnel support in all applicable areas. The
pre-FRR meeting was the only formal GSE review. The GSE was not reviewed again as
part of the CSM subsystem team reviews, although a GSE representative was available
to resolve any interface problems between the vehicle subsystems and the GSE. Open
items were presented to meetings of the MSC preboard and the FRR Board.
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TABLE V.- GROUND-SUPPORT-EQUIPMENT REVIEW TEAM TASKS FOR FRR
Tasks
I. Review GSE t_,ing us¢,d for the first time for proper
configuration and vahdatton.
2. Ensure that tnMalled GSE is of the i)rolR'r conligxl-
ration and has been validated.
3. Review all Sl_.,cial lest equq)ment and wurkarq_nds
that are used in cehicle test and checkout Io en-
sure that tesl and checkout requiremenls art, not
c0mprumised.
4. Ensure that redundancy requirements are m,.t for
redundant units and spare_.
$. Review pertinent actions [rum prior GSE reviews,
6. Review open work applicable to site activation and
validation to determine that coglstraints arc
properly identified.
7. Review open modifications for conzRrainta to further
testing.
8. Ensure that applicable failures and l)rcvi_szs anom-
altos related to the GSE under review have been
reported and assessed.
9. Audit configuration accu_nting documents to ensure
that EO's resulting from failures and unsatisfac-
tory conditions have been implemented in the
GSE, including launch-critical spares. (Safety
failures should be considered on a pr_ram
basis. )
10. Ensure that GSE spares are available to support
items open in the OPLS.
11. Evaluate Mmlf-llfe, recycle, and recalibration data
for potential constraints.
12. Ensure that GSE launch-critical spares are avail-
able in the correct configuration
13, Ensure that the specified preventive maintenance
has been accomplished or planned.
14. Ensure that corrective action has been taken or is
planned on problems found by the Gr0und Safely
Hazard Review.
15. Ensure that corrective action has been taken or
planned as the result of UR's and unsatisfactory
condition records (UCR's).
Data retirements
ColRrach)r-iJrt'pared listof GSE t. b_' used
f_;"tht'first tirol'(new parl number (Jr
dash number )
GSE Periodlc Maintenance and Site Checkout
Plan (EO2l 5)
TCOP
KO215
Status of TCP's apl)hcabh" to GSE
Modification summary drawing_
CVR's (Ol_'n and cl._edl
OPtS
GSE prubh, n_ summarles
KO2I 5
RCSlxmsibilily
(a)
SSM R&QA
(1) (2)
(1) (2)
(1) (2)
List of GSE versus TCP's (TCOP matrix) (1) (2)
C'i)y of all open program action GSE (1) (2)
FRPJD" s
Copy of ".dl GSE FRRID's from previous two
vehicles (closed and open)
OPLS for m(_oiic launcher, mobile service (1) (2)
structure, and pad area
Open modification kit status -- NR (l) (2)
Contractual direction - NASA-furnished
upon Field Change Authorization rept)rt
DR log (2) (1)
Closed DR's (as requested)
Open DR's (unstation TAIR book)
OPtS
GSE operational readiness report problem
summaries
List of EO's to be audited (NASA supplied) b(l ) C(I)
CVR's (open and cl.sed) (in configuration
control areas)
OPtS
Launch°critical spares list
Status of undelivered launch-critical spares
OPts b(I) ""
Warehouse time-critical tabulation run
Launch-critical spares list
Warehouse time-critical tabulation run b(l) (2)
Preventive maintenance work order (PMWO)
(onsite TAIR book)
Apollo GSE time/age component replacement
list (SD 68-925)
Launch-critical spares list d(t) (2)
Status of undelivered launch-critical spares
PMWO (onstle TAIR book) b(l) (2)
TPS's on request
1(O21 5
Ground safety hazard analysis document (2) (I)
UR's (I) (2)
UCR' s
a(1) denotes prime responsibtlity: (2) denotes support responsibility.
bprime responsibility for spares.
Cprime responsibility for failures and unsuttsfactory conditions.
dprime responsibility for logistics.
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Representatives of the following MSC offices reviewed the data and reported their
findings on FRRID forms.
1. R&QA Office
2. Test Division
3. Engineering and Development Directorate (ACE only)
4. Program Control Office (logistics)
5. Safety Office (as appropriate)
At the conclusion of the data review, the MSC representatives also executed readiness
statements indicating any constraints. The contractor supported the review teams with
representatives from Downey electrical GSE, mechanical GSE, and reliability. At a
meeting after the data review, the FRPJD's resulting from the GSE pre-FRR meeting
were presented for final disposition to the Chief, Test Division, MSC, and to the Chief,
CSM Engineering Division, KSC.
Spacecraft formal data review: As soon as possible after the completion of inte-
grated tests, a 3-day formal review of the SSAD and supplemental data was conducted
at KSC. This review was an evaluation of the data provided in support of the specific
team tasks enumerated in tables IV and V. The review teams, by subsystem (table HI),
had the following members.
1. MSC SSM (team leader)
2. MSC R&QA representative
3. NR systems engineer (or his designee)
4. NR-LO systems specialists (on call)
5. KSC systems engineers (as their time allowed)
Members-at-large: The subsystem review team members-at-large or their
designated representatives attended all sessions and were available for consultation
to all subsystem review teams. Members-at-large maintained awareness of all activ-
ities, reviewed all FRRID's submitted, and offered constructive criticism. The fol-
lowing individuals were members-at-large from NASA.
1. ASPO project engineer
2. RASPO-KSC project engineer
3. KSC project engineer (on call)
4. KSC R&QA representative (on call)
5. MSC R&QA representative
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6. NASA-Downey CMO representative
7. MSC Safety Office representative
Contractor members-at-large were representatives from the following NR organizations.
1. Program Reliability
2. Program CMO
3. Program Quality
4. Project Engineering
Team minutes: Team minutes were compiled daily for the purpose of recording
the activity of the team and of indicating the team tasks completed, the FRRID's sub-
mired, and other significant information. Minutes were to be submitted to the FRR
control station no later than 8:30 a.m. on the following day. The team leader was re-
sponsible for the preparation of the team minutes.
Use of FRRID's: The FRRID's were used to identify specific problems by citing
part number, reference documentation, and a brief summary of how the problem was
identified. In the FRRID, a specific action for solving the problem was recommended
and a specific constraint including the logic for arriving at the constraint was given.
Design review or product improvement items or items affecting mission rules were to
be handled through program (CCP or CCB) channels rather than through FRRID's. No
FRRID's were to be written for planned work (including open DR' s) unless the schedule
for completion of the planned work would not support the overall schedule of events.
No FRRIDts were to be written on open certifications and open CSM failures because
the contractor presented data on these subjects to the FRR Board. The FRRID's could
be generated on GSE problems if NASA took exception to the operational readiness re-
port problem summary and if the problem might impact launch. The FRRID's were to
be submitted as soon as they were written to allow the contractor time to respond. The
FRRID's submitted after the deadline, which was announced at the FRR kickoff meeting,
were not to be processed.
The NASA-NR coordinator team: The NASA-NR coordinator team consisted of
the Chief, Review Planning Office, MSC; the RASPO-KSC project engineer; the NR-
Downey Project Engineering representative; the NR-LO representative; the KSC Space-
craft Operations representative; and the ASPO-MSC project engineer. The team was
responsible for the following.
1. Establishing an FRR control station
2. Reviewing FRRID's and advising team members in preparation of FRRID's
3. Reviewing and coordinating FRRID resolutions
4. Serving as FRR Board and preboard secretariat
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5. Assisting any or all team members with problem areas at any time
6. Preparing and publishing minutes
Contractor in-house review: The contractor could elect to conduct a review of
FRRID's and briefings before the MSC preboard meeting. If such a review was held,
the NASA FRR coordinator was invited to attend.
The NASA preboard: The NASA preboard conducted a review of all FRRID prob-
lems and FRRID resolutions and established the agenda items for the FRR Board meet-
ing. The NASA preboard informally reviewed the contractor presentations for the FRR
Board. The preboard members were designated by the FRR Board members. The con-
tractor provided personnel of sufficient authority to accept the action items of the pre-
board. The preboard meeting was scheduled to allow the contractor a minimum of
5 working days in which to prepare responses to the review team FRRID's.
The FRR Board. - The FRR Board reviewed the special briefings and the FRRID's
presented and determined the action required to bring the spacecraft to a condition of
readiness for flight. The FRR Board meeting was scheduled at a time that did not con-
flict with the Flight Readiness Test. The organization of the FRR Board was as follows.
I. Chairman -- Director or Deputy Director, MSC
2. Vice-chairman -- Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program, MSC
3. Members
a. Manager for the Command and Service Modules, MSC
b. Manager for the Lunar Module, MSC
c. Manager for Experiments and GFE, MSC
d. Director of Flight Crew Operations, MSC
e. Assistant Program Manager for Flight Safety, ASPO, MSC
f. Director of Medical Research and Operations, MSC
g. Director of Engineering and Development, MSC
h. Director of Flight Operations, MSC
i. Director of Science and Applications, MSC
j. Manager for Safety Office and R&QA Office, MSC
k. Manager, NASA-Downey
1. Manager, RASPO-KSC
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m. Mission Director, Apollo Program, NASA Headquarters
n. Director, Apollo Test, NASA Headquarters
o. Director, KSC
p. Director of Launch Operations, KSC
q. Director of Spacecraft Operations, KSC
r. Manager, Apollo Program, KSC
4. Secretariat-- CSM and LM Project Engineering Division representatives, MSC
Meetings: Meetings of the FRR Board consisted of an NR summary presentation
of the subjects identified in the following paragraph and a detailed presentation of the
FRRID' s. The FRR Board defined the actions required to proceed with the countdown
and launch of the CSM and the SLA. The FRR Board meeting was scheduled after the
Flight Readiness Test.
Presentations: The contractor made the following presentations to the FRR Board.
1. Closed or information FRRID's
2. Significant configuration differences
3. Status of flight anomalies from previous mission
4. Certification test status
5. Reused hardware summary
6. Significant CSM open failures and unsatisfactory conditions
7. Critical single-point failure summary
8. Limited life summary
9. Contract specification waivers and deviations
10. Spacecraft issues (defined for each CSM)
11. Status of flight-critical CSM and GSE spares
12. Open launch-impact GSE problems
13. Test Specification and Criteria Document waivers
14. KSC history and open work
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15. Contractor safety assessment
16. Open FRRID's (requiring board disposition)
17. Sneak-circuit analysis results and status
Action items: The FRR Board secretariat recorded the board action items and
made them available for approval by the board chairman or his designee immediately
following meeting adjournment. Those action items that were considered to be con-
straints to further testing or launch of the vehicle under review were so identified.
Each action item was annotated on the FRRID under consideration. Contractor person-
nel with sufficient authority to accept or negotiate these actions attended the FRR Board
meetings. Action items affecting other vehicles were closed by generating a program
action FRRID.
Minutes: Minutes of the FRR preboard and FRR Board meetings were prepared
jointly by NASA and NR. Single points of contact to assist the secretariat in this task
were designated by NASA and the contractor. The minutes were prepared and made
available for approval by the chairman within 24 hours after meeting adjournment.
Program action FRRID's assigned by the chairman were included in the minutes and
summarized by an attachment to the minutes.
Action item resolution: The FRRID closeout submittals and action item resolu-
tions were coordinated by the MSC Review Planning Office. The Manager for the Com-
mand and Service Modules, MSC (or his designee), determined when proper action had
been implemented to resolve the action items resulting from the FRR Board meeting.
Constraints to further testing or to launch, as defined by the FRR Board, were consid-
ered removed only by this determination of action item resolutions. The Manager for
the CSM confirmed or rejected all NR submittals for closeout of action items or FRRID's
in a timely manner that supported the launch schedule.
Status report of action items: The contractor provided a formal status report of
all open FRRID's and other action items to the Manager for the Command and Service
Modules, Apollo Spacecraft Program, MSC. The status report included the following.
1. The FRRID number
2. The action abstract
3. The reference to closeout documentation
A status report was submitted to NASA following the ECS and CCFF reviews. A
second status report was provided following the GSE review. Interim reports were sub-
mitted if the status changed significantly or if the contractor could not complete the ac-
tionitem closeouts before the assigned constraint. In the period between the MSC FRR
Board meeting and the NASA Headquarters FRR, status reports were provided weekly.
Daily closeout actions were coordinated by telephone, and facsimiles were trans-
mitted to the MSC Review Planning Office so that a real-time status could be maintained.
The MSC Review Planning Office kept the appropriate KSC office posted on closeout
status.
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The NASA Headquarters FRR. - The NASA Headquarters FRR was held at KSC.
The contractor supported this review with management personnel of sufficient authority
to accept or negotiate action items assigned by the FRR Board. The contractor was
requested to prepare and present briefings on the CSM. In addition, the contractor was
requested to support MSC in the preparation of briefings on contractor-furnished equip-
ment for portions of the CSM.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The milestone review process provided NASA with positive assurance that each
subsystem was assessed by both contractor and NASA personnel and, except for the
problems noted on the customer acceptance review item dispositions and the flight
readiness review item dispositions, that the command and service module was ready
to proceed to the next milestone or flight. The milestone review process identified
numerous hardware and software problems and allowed the contractor a specific amount
of time to resolve these problems before the command and service module completion
schedule was impacted.
The frequent working sessions resulted in the development of a rapport between
the contractor and NASA subsystem engineers that improved the NASA-contractor work-
ing relationship by the establishment of mutual confidence and communications at the
working level. The milestone review process imposed a discipline on both the contrac-
tor and NASA that encouraged better work and greater attention to detail and thereby
contributed to a successful command and service module program.
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Houston, Texas, November 12., 1973
961-11-00-00-72
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APPENDI X A
CONTENTS OF SYSTEM SUMMARY ACCEPTANCE DOCUMENTS
FOR CU STOMER ACCEPTANCE READINESS REVIEWS
SUMMARYOFCONTENTS
Each System Summary Acceptance Document (SSAD) for a Customer Acceptance
Readiness Review (CARR) wiU be divided into the following sections. When a section
is not applicable, it will be so stated.
1. Readiness statements
2. Intentional blank
3. Latest parts list
4. Contract specifications list (SSAD 4. 34 only)
5. Contract specification waivers
6. Parts serialization list
7. Engineering Order Accountability System (EOAS) printout
8. Unreleased engineering data list
9. Parts removal summary
10. Hardware shortage list
11. Temporary installation record (TIR) (Phase wI CARR only)
12. Fit-check summary (Phase HI CARR only)
13. Open disposition records (DR's) and disposition record squawk sheets
(DRSS's) (except test DR's)
14. Open material review disposition records (DR-MR's)
15. Open engineering orders CEO's) and drawings
16. Intentional blank
17. Intentional blank
18. Closed DR's and DRSS's (except DR-MR's, corrective action request
disposition records (DR-CAR's), disposition record unsatisfactory conditions
(DRUC's), and test DR's)
19. Closed DR-MR's
20. Unsatisfactory reports (UR's)
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21. Openfailures
22. Intentional blank
23. Intentional blank
24. 'Operating time/cycle records
25. Intentional blank
26. Downey checkout specifications (DCS's)
27. Test project engineer (TPE) reports or test cell supervisor 's report
28. Downey checkout evaluation (DCOE) report (Phase III CARR only)
29. Test preparation sheets (TPS's)
30. Intentional blank
31. Associate contractor guidance and navigation (G&N) report (SSAD 2.15 only)
32. Intentional blank
33. First flight components (SSAD 4. 34 only)
34. Intentional blank
35. Irregular parts list (IPL)
36. Modification after integrated test (SSAD 4. 34, Phase III CARR only)
37. Customer acceptance review item disposition (CARID) status (Phase HI
CARR only)
38.
39.
40.
reuse
Intentional blank
Intentional blank
Apollo spacecraft hardware utilization requests (ASHUR's) and hardware
evaluation (HRE) requests
41. Intentional blank
42. Intentional blank
/
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DETAIL OF CONTENTS
The SSAD book data shall be limited to the specific command and service module
(CSM) under consideration unless otherwise noted and to copies of existing documenta-
tion or an extraction from an existing data system.
1. Readiness statements -- The readiness statements shall be filled out and
signed at the conclusion of each system review. Readiness statements are signed by
the NASA and contractor representatives. The contractor will sign the readiness
statements during the contractor SSAD review before the NASA review.
2. Section 2 will be left blank.
3. Latest parts list -- An alphanumeric, "as designed" parts list for the partic-
ular system will be provided. This list will include part number (P/N), nomenclature,
next assembly, quantity, and traceability for contractor parts, specification control
drawing parts, and field installed parts.
4. Contract specifications list (SSAD 4.34 only) --The contract specifications
that are applicable to the CSM being reviewed will be listed in SSAD 4.34 ("CSM
General") only.
5. Contract specification waivers -- A copy of each contract specification waiver
or deviation accumulated since the preceding phase will be included.
6. Parts serialization list --A list is required of serial and lot numbers based
on the manufacturing completion records for all parts that require traceability in
accordance with the engineering drawing and that have been installed on the vehicle.
7, EOAS printout --The EOAS printout will be included in this section. The
Phase III CARR input will be limited to delta data from the previous phase.
8. Unreleased engineering data list _ A list of unreleased contractor engineer-
ing data will be provided. The list shall be coded to reflect those items that affect
hardware and to identify the constraint points.
9. Parts removal summary -- The parts removal summary is a tabulation by
P/N based on the parts serialization list (section 6) summarizing open removals and
all parts that have been replaced on the vehicle.
10. Hardware shortage list _ The hardware shortage list should include all
items that do not support the normal departmental installation requirement. The list
will be based on the fabrication and inspection record and the test and inspection
record shortage sheets.
11. TIR (Phase III CARR only) _ A TIR that contains temporary installations of
category B (nonflight functional) and category C (flight items being fit checked) items
will be provided for Phase III CARR's.
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12. Fit-check summary (Phase HI CARR only) -- A summary of the field site
installation that requires a Downey (or Tulsa for spacecraft/lunar module adapter) fit
check will be provided for Phase HI CARR's. The fit-check completion status will be
included.
13. Open DR's and DRSS's (except test DR's) -- Copies of open DR's, open
DRSS's, and open DRUC's (except test DR's) will be included.
14. Open DR-MR's h Copies of open material review dispositions (MRD's) and
open DR-MR's will be included.
15. Open EO's and drawings -- A list of open EO's according to the open item
status report and the drawing that each EO is effective against will be included. A
copy of each open EO will be included, and the list will indicate the constraint coding
of the EO.
16. Section 16 will be left blank.
17. Section 17 will be left blank.
18. Closed DR's and DRSS's (except DR-MR's, DR-CAR's, DRUC's, and test
DR's) -- Copies of closed DR's and DRSS's that do not define failures will be included.
In addition, any corrective action records will be included (delta from preceding CARR).
19. Closed DR-MR'sh Copies of closed MRD's and closed DR-MR's will be
included (delta from preceding CARR).
20. UR's- Copies of all open and closed NASA UR's that have accrued since
the last phase and that are specifically related to the vehicle under review will be
included.
21. Open failures-- Copies of open failure program action requests, DR-CAR's,
or failure reports written on the vehicle under review shall be included. Any open
failure shall be defined as a failure for which corrective action to preclude recurrence
has not been approved by NASA.
22. Section 22 will be left blank.
23. Section 23 will be left blank.
24. Operating time/cycle records-- Copies of the code A (as defined by speci-
fication MA0201-0077) hardware cumulative time records will be included along with
the milestone data so that the remaining useful life can be assessed easily. Pressure
vessel cycle data will be included for each pressure cycle.
25. Section 25 will be left blank.
26. DCS's -- A list of the checkout requirements showing status and copies of
the annotated, "as run" DCS's including the associated test readiness lists, TPS's,
test variances, and test DR's will be included. (Phase HI CARR data shall be delta
from the Phase I CARR.) Manufacturing test procedures will be included for the
Phase I CARR.
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P27. TPE reports or test cell supervisor's report--- A list of the checkout
requirements showing status and a copy of each applicable report are to be included.
28. DCOE report (Phase IS CARR only) -- A list of the checkout requirements
showing status and a copy of each applicable DCOE report are to be included for the
Phase IS CARR only.
29. TPS's -- A copy of each applicable TPS (excluding TPS's included in sec-
tion 26, "DCS's") will be included.
30. Section 30 will be left blank.
31. Associate contractor G&N report (SSAD 2. 15 only)- Information contained
in this section shall be provided in lieuof prime contractor inputs for all SSAD 2.15
sections that require G&N information not under prime contractor cognizance.
32. Section 32 will be left blank.
33. First flight components (SSAD 4. 34 only)- A list by P/N and name of each
certification-test-network-level part that has not been flown on a previous mission is
to be included.
34. Section 34 will be left blank.
35. IPL-- An IPL documenting the use of irregular parts and the rationale for
their acceptance in flight hardware applications will be provided.
36. Modification after integrated test (SSAD 4. 34, Phase IH CARR only)- A
list with a short narrative description of all modifications or rework planned after
integrated test and before shipment will be included. The impact on retest require-
ments is to be included for the Phase HI CARR only.
37. CARID status (Phase HI CARR only)- A list of CARID's from the previous
increment along with a short narrative summary describing the status of each will be
provided. A copy of each CARID and the contractor's response will be included for the
Phase HI CARR only. The SSAD 4. 34 book will include the CARID's numbered 5.24
to 5.33.
38. Section 38 will be left blank.
39. Section 39 will be left blank.
40. ASHUR's and HRE requests-- Copies of all ASHUR's and HRE requests
applicable to previously flown hardware items currently installed in the CSM under
review will be included.
41. Section 41 will be left blank.
42. Section 42 will be left blank.
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APPENDIX B
SUPPORTING DATA FOR CUSTOMER ACCEPTANCE
READINESS REVlEVVS
SUPPORTI NG DATA
The following data are required as reference documentation to support the Custo-
mer Acceptance Readiness Review (CAP_) team reviews and include program related
data.
CATEGORYA DATA
The following category A data will be provided at the review.
be of the latest revision and will be dated.
All material will
1. Specification change notices (SCN's) pending NASA approval
2. Process specification index
3. Indentured parts list
4. Configuration index (alphanumeric parts list)
5. Integrated system schematics
6. Critical life item specification (MA0201-0077)
7. Program failure tape
8. Historical product plan
9. Pressure vessel data in accordance with supplemental agreement SA300
10. Supplier data package list (SID 67-570B)
11. Unexplained test anomalies test and inspection record (TAIR) book
12. Engineering Order Accountability System history report (alphanumeric)
13. Nonmetallic materials summary acceptance document
14. Instrumentation equipment list (specification MA0505-0040)
15. Open item status report
16. Shakedown inspection (Inspection Test and Instructions)
17. Recap and movement authorization report (Phase HI CARR only)
18. Shel_-life specification (MA0201-5695)
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CATEGORY B DATA
The following category B data will be provided on special request by drawing
number_ engineering order (EO) number, and so forth.
1. Drawings and EOts
2. Process specifications
3. Interface control drawings
4. Unaccomplished Downey checkout specifications that have been released
for review or formally released
5. Material usage agreements and Characteristics of Materials summary
tabulation run on nonmetallic materials
6. Contract specifications with all approved SCN's
7. Test and Checkout Requirements Document with all change notices
8. Test Specification and Criteria Document with all change notices
9. Copy of all master change records
10. Spacecraft/lunar module adapter review narrative report in accordance
with applicable procedure
11. Data packages for hardware built by Grumman Aerospace Corporation
(Phase IH CARR only)
12. Configuration verification record (CVR) (records research only)
CATEGORY C DATA
The following category C data will be available for review at the Quality Data
Center_ North American Rockwell Corporation_ Downey_ California.
1. Acceptance data package
2. Closed fabricationand inspection record (includingout-of-stationrework)
3. Closed TAIR
4. Closed CVR
5. Supplier data package
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6. Instrumentation data
7. X-rays and N-rays
8. Contamination reports (environmental control systew, reaction control
system, and service propulsion system)
9. Shelf-life records
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APPENDIX C
CONTENTS OF SYSTEM SUMMARY ACCEPTANCE DOCUMENTS FOR
FLIGHTREADINESS REVIEWS
SYSTEM SUMMARYACCEPTANCEDOCUMENT
Each command and service module (CSM) system (including the spacecraft/lunar
module adapter) designated in table HI shall have a separate System Summary Accept-
ance Document (SSAD) prepared to document the history of that system area. The SSAD
data shall be limited to the specific vehicle under consideration unless otherwise noted
and to copies of existing documentation or to an extraction from existing documentation.
SUMMARYOFCONTENTS
Each SSAD will be divided into the following sections. When a section is
designated as "not used" or has limited applicability, no divider or data are required.
1. Readiness statements
2. Not used
3. Parts list
4. Contract specifications list (SSAD 4. 34 only)
5. Contract specification waivers
6. Parts serialization list
7. Engineering Order Accountability System (EOAS) printout
8. Unreleased engineering data list
9. Parts removal summary
10. Hardware shortage list (SSAD 4. 34 only)
11. Temporary installation record (TIR)
12. Test Specification and Criteria Document (TSCD) and Test and Checkout
Requirements Document (TCRD) waivers (SSAD 4. 34 only)
13. Open disposition records (DR's) and corrective action requests (CAR's)
14. Open material reviews (MR's) and CAR's
15. Open engineering orders (EO's)
16. Not used
17. Engineering analyses
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18. Closed DR's and CAR's
19. Closed MR's and CAR's
20. Unsatisfactory reports (UR's) (SSAD 4. 34 only)
21. Not used
22. Not used
23. Not used
24. Operating time/cycle record
25. Not used
26. Annotated test checkout procedures (TCP's)
27. Test summary reports
28. Downey checkout evaluation (DCOE) reports
29. Test preparation sheets (TPS's)
30. Not used
31. Not used
32. Not used
33. First flight components (SSAD 4. 34 only)
34. Launch-critical spares list
35. Irregular parts list (IPL) (SSAD 4. 34 only)
36. Modification after integrated test (SSAD 4. 34 only)
37. Customer acceptance review item dispositions (CARID's) and responses
38. Not used
39. Not used
40. Apollo spacecraft hardware utilization requests (ASHUR's) and hardware
reuse evaluations (HRE's)
41. Not used
42. Not used
f
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DETAIL OF CONTENTS
The following list contains details of SSAD section contents.
1. Readiness statements -- The readiness statements shall be signed by the
contractor at the conclusion of each subsystem review.
2. Section 2 will not be used.
3. Parts list -- An alphanumeric parts list shall be provided. This list will
include contractor parts, specification control drawing parts, Government-furnished
equipment (GFE), and field installed parts. Information presented in this parts list
will include part number, nomenclature, next assembly, quantity, and traceability
coding.
4. Contract specifications list (SSAD 4. 34 only) -- A list of all contract speci-
fications that are applicable to the vehicle being reviewed shall be provided for SSAD
4. 34 only.
5. Contract specification waivers --A copy of each NASA-contractor contract
specification waiver or deviation shall be provided. Data shall be delta from the
Phase HI Customer Acceptance Readiness Review (CARR).
6. Parts serialization list -- A list of those parts identified in the alphanumeric
parts list (section 3) that are required to have traceability in accordance with the
engineering drawing and that have been installed on the vehicle shall be provided. This
list will show serial and lot numbers based on the manufacturing completion records.
7. EOAS printout -- A copy of the EOAS history report shall be provided. The
data will be delta from the Phase HI CARR data cut-off. (This section is intended to
show change traffic since the Phase HI CARR but does not necessarily correlate with
section 15, "Open EO's. ")
8. Unreleased engineering data list m A list of unreleased contractor engineering
data. shall be provided. The list shall be coded to reflect those items that affect hard-
ware and to identify the constraint points. This list also will be ceded to items on the
latest product plan.
9. Parts removal summary -- A tabulation by part number based on the parts
serialization list (section 6) summarizing open removals and parts that have been
replaced on the vehicle shall be provided. Data shall be delta from the Phase HI CARR.
10. Hardware shortage list (SSAD 4. 34 only) -- A list of all parts (including
GFE) that do not support the normal department installation requirements shall be
provided. This list will be based on the fabrication and inspection record and the test
and inspection record shortage sheets. The parts shall be coded with the appropriate
SSAD number and listedin SSAD system numerical order in SSAD 4.34 only.
11. TIR _ A TIR that contains temporary installation of category B (nonflight
functional) and category C (flight items being fit checked) items shall be provided.
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12. TSCD and TCRD waivers (SSAD 4. 34 only) -- A copy of each John F. Kennedy
Space Center Launch Operations waiver or deviation will be included. The waivers will
be marked with the SSAD system numbers and filed in numerical order in SSAD 4. 34
only.
13. Open DR's and CAR's -- A copy of each open DR and any associated CAR
except for MR items will be included.
14. Open MR's and CAR's -- A copy of each open material review disposition
record (DR-MR) (a DR that has been elevated to an MR) and any associated CAR will
be included.
15. Open EO's -- A copy of each EO that is open according to the configuration
verification record will be provided.
16. Section 16 will not be used.
17. Engineering analyses -- A copy of any engineering analysis to support
material review dispositions (MRD's) in areas where possible system degradation can
occur will be provided. Each analysis must include the composite effect of prior MRD's
so that total system integrity can be demonstrated. If no analysis is required, a
statement listing the MR's reviewed and affirming that no analysis is required will be
provided.
18. Closed DR's and CAR's -- A copy of each closed DR and any associated CAR
except for MR items will be included.
19. Closed MR's and CAR's -- A copy of each closed DR-MR and any associated
CAR will be included.
20. UR's (SSAD 4.34 only) -- A copy of all open and closed NASA UR's specifi-
cally related to the vehicle under review shall be provided. A copy of the contractor
response shall be provided for each closed item. The UR's will be coded with the
appropriate SSAD system number and filed in numerical order in SSAD 4. 34 only. Data
shall be delta from the Phase ]II CARR.
21. Section 21 will not be used.
22. Section 22 will not be used.
23. Section 23 will not be used.
24. Operating time/cycle record- Copies of the code A (as defined by specifica-
tion MA0201-0077) hardware cumulative time records shall be provided. The milestone
data shall be provided so that the remaining useful life can be assessed easily. Pressure
vessel cycle data will be included for each pressure cycle.
25. Section 25 will not be used.
26. Annotated TCP's -- Each annotated, "as run" TCP shall be provided along
with applicable test deviations. (Tests relating to multiple systems, to modules, or
to the CSM stack are in SSAD 4. 34. )
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27. Test summary reports -- A list of tests requiring test summary reports and
a copy of each report will be provided.
28. DCOE reports -- A copy of each applicable DCOE shall be provided. The
data will be delta from the Phase HI CARR.
29. TPS's -- A copy of each applicable TPS shall be provided. Data shall be
delta from the Phase III CARR.
30. Section 30 will not be used.
31. Section 31 will not be used.
32. Section 32 will not be used.
33. First flight components (SSAD 4. 34 only) -- A list by part number and name
(based on the alphanumeric parts list, section 3) of each certification-test-network-
level part that has not been flown on a previous mission will be provided. Parts shall
be coded with the applicable SSAD system number and listed in SSAD numerical order
in SSAD 4. 34 only.
34. Launch-critical spares list -- An alphanumeric listing of the spare parts
that will be held in a condition of flight readiness for the vehicle being reviewed shall
be provided.
35. IPL (SSAD 4.34 only) -- The IPL will contain the parts installedsince the
Phase IIICARR. The IPL will be coded with the SSAD system number and listedin
SSAD sequence in SSAD 4. 34 only.
36. Modification after integrated test (SSAD 4. 34 only) -- A list of all modifica-
tions and rework planned or completed after integrated test shall be provided. The
list will include a short narrative description of the modification and the retest require-
ments, if any. The list will be included in SSAD 4. 34 ("CSM General") only. The
items will be coded with the applicable SSAD system code and listed in numerical order.
37. CARID's and responses -- A copy of each CARID with the contractor' s
response from the Phase III CARR, delta environmental control system data, and
delta crew compartment fit and function data will be provided. (The CARID's numbered
5.23 to 5.33 will be included in SSAD 4.34. )
38. Section 38 will not be used.
39. Section 39 will not be used.
40. ASHUR's and HRE's -- A copy of each ASHUR and each HRE applicable to
previously flown hardware items currently installed in the vehicle under review shall
be provided.
41. Section 41 will not be used.
42. Section 42 will not be used.
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APPENDIX D
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA FOR FLIGHT READI NESS REVI EWS
SU PPLEMENTAL DATA
The following data are required as reference documentation to support the Flight
Readiness Review team reviews.
CATEGORY A DATA
The following category A data will be'provided at the review. All material will
be of the latest revision and will be dated.
1. Parts I and H contract specification with all approved specification change
notices (SCN's)
2. Part II specification SCN's pending NASA approval
3. Test and Checkout Requirements Document for John F. Kennedy Space
Center (KSC)
.
5.
6.
.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
re spon se s
Test Specification and Criteria Document
Indentured parts list
Configuration index (System Summary Acceptance Document coded)
Integrated system schematics (as applicable)
Critical life item specification (MA0201-0077)
KSC Test Checkout Operational Plan
Shelf-life specification (MA0201-5695)
Pressure vessel data (in accordance with supplemental agreement SA300)
Fracture mechanics analysis summary form
Supplier data package list (SID 67-570C)
List of Launch Operations unexplained test anomalies
Engineering Order Accountability System history report (subsystem report)
Nonmetallic materials summary acceptance document
Operation page and line schedules
Copy of all customer acceptance review item dispositions (CA_RID's) and
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19. Open modification status report
20. Flight-critical spares shortage list
21. Master measurement configuration list
22. Apollo warehouse time-critical tabulation run
23. CARID status list (includes number, title, and status)
24. KSC constraints document
25. Title listing of all structural subsystem squawksp interim disposition records,
disposition records, and material review disposition records in numerical sequence
(structures subsystem only)
26. Limited life tabulation run, by spacecraft
27. Process specification index
28. Historical product plan
CATEGORYB DATA
The following category B data will be provided upon special request by drawing
number, engineering order (EO) number, and so forth.
1. Drawings and EO's
2. Process specifications
3. Interface control drawings
4. Unaccomplished test checkout procedures that have been released for review
or formally released
5. Material usage agreements and Characteristics of Materials summary tabu-
lation run on nonmetallic materials
6. Master change records
7. Closeout photographs
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CATEGORY C DATA
The following category C data will be available for review at the Quality Data
Center, North American Rockwell Launch Operations, Kennedy Space Center, Florida.
1. Acceptance data package
2. Test and inspection record (closed)
3. Closed configuration status records
4. Supplier data packages (restricted to items installed since Phase HI Customer
Acceptance Readiness Review including Grumman Aerospace Corporation items, except
pyrotechnic devices)
5. X-rays taken at KSC in support of specific problems
6. Shelf-life records
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APPENDIX E
DATA REQUIRED FOR GROUND-SUPPORT-EQUI PMENT REVIEW
DATA REQUIREMENTS
The following data are required to support the ground-support-equipment (GSE)
review before the Flight Readiness Review.
Ground safety hazards analysis document
Modification summary drawings
Open modification status report
List of GSE used first time, including part number and dash number for
le
2.
3.
4.
each item
5.
6.
including
7.
8.
and flight
9.
Operation page and line schedules
GSE operational readiness problem summaries (and handwritten update),
launch-impact problem summaries
NASA corrective action request (as applicable to GSE)
Copy and status of customer acceptance review item dispositions (CARID's)
readiness review item dispositions from previous two reviews
Copy of open GSE program action CARID's
10. Status of test checkout procedures applicable to GSE (completed, scheduled,
and annotated)
11. Test Checkout Operational Plan (K0203)
12. GSE Periodic Maintenance and Site Checkout Plan (K0215)
13. Launch-critical GSE spares list (SD 67-929)
14. Status of undelivered launch-critical spares
15. Apollo GSE time/age component replacement list (SD 68-925)
16. Apollo warehouse time-critical tabulation run
17. Open Field Change Authorization (FCA) report
18. Test and inspection record (onstation, including disposition records (DR's))
19. Closed GSE configuration status records (in configuration control area)
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20. Integrated system schematics; installation drawings; individual drawings;
and closed DR's, test preparation sheets, FCA's, andpreventive maintenancework
orders (available on specific request by specific number)
21. NASAunsatisfactory condition records (as applicable to GSE)
72
APPENDIX F
IMPLEMENTING CORRESPONDENCEFOR A
CUSTOMER ACCEPTANCEREADI NESS REVI EW
@
REPLY TO
ATTNOF: PF6-0/49-72
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
HOUSTON,TEXAS 77058
April 24, 1972
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Skylab Distribution 19
PA/Manager for the Command and Service Modules
Apollo Spacecraft Program
Customer Acceptance Readiness Review for Spacecraft ll8,
Phase I
The Customer Acceptance Readiness Review (CARR) Board for Spacecraft 118,
Phase I will be held in Building 2, Room 602, MSC, Houston, Texas, and
at North American Rockwell Corporation, Downey, California, via tele-
communications on May 16, 1972, at l:00 p.m., c.d.t.
Board Members
Chairman: Manager for the Command and Service Modules
Apollo Spacecraft Program
Member s : Skylab Program Office, Representative, MSC
Chief, CSM Project Engineering Division, MSC
Safety Office, Representative, MSC
Engineering and Development Directorate,
Representative, MSC
Reliability and Quality Assurance, Representative,
MSC or Downey
Manager, NASA-Downey
Project Engineering, Representative, NASA-Downey
Test Engineering Office, Representative, NASA-
Downey
Secretariat: CSM Project _gineering Division, Representative,
MSC
It is requested that any substitutions of board members be cleared
with the Manager for the Command and Service Modules, Apollo
Spacecraft Program, MSC.
Review Location/Schedule
The Team Reviews will be held in the Assembly Room, Building i,
E-Downey.
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Accumulated Data Cutoff
Data Inventory
Opening Briefing
Reliability and Subsystem
Team Reviews
Team Report Preparation
CARR Board
8:30 a.m.
8:45
9:00-
3:00 p.m.
l:00 p.m.
Apr. 28
May 8
May 8
May 8-
May l0
May 15
May 16
c.d.t, via telephone
Notification of any change in scheduled CARR dates or location will
be provided prior to the start of the CARR.
Data and Documentation
The data and documentation for this review will be in accordance with
contractual requirements and will be sorted by subsystem and by module
included in SSAD's (System Summary Acceptance Documents). Data too
bulky and data that do not lend themselves to sorting will be available
at NR-Downey, California. The required information may be obtained by
telephone. ACE data will be included in the supplemental data.
Customer Acceptance Review Item Disposition (CARID's)
CARID's are to be prepared in accordance with the CARR plan. They will
be submitted to the CARR secretary for number assignment and typing.
Contractor responses to CARID's will be cleared through the CARR
secretary. CARID's should be submitted as soon as they are prepared.
Readiness Statements
Readiness statements will be prepared in accordance with the CARR plan.
They will be submitted to the CARR secretary, identifying all items
which may affect test readiness or acceptance.
Review Teams
Reliability and Quality, subsystem, and special teams for NASA/contractor
organizations, as established by the CARR plan, will review the data and
documentation provided by the contractor.
The following systems will be reviewed:
SSAD Book Numbers
LES CM SM SUBSYSTEM
1.1 2.1 3.1
1.2 2.2 3.2
1.3 2.3 3.3
2.5 3.5
Structures
Ordnance
Mechanical
Environmental Control System
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LES CM SM
2.6 3.6
2.7 3.7
1.8 2.8 3.8
2.9
2.10
2. ii 3. ii
2.12 3.12
2.13
2.lh
2.15
2.16
2.17
3.18
3.19
3.20
SUBSYST_N
Reaction Control System
Instrumentation
Electrical Power System and Wiring
Entry Monitor System
Stabilization and Control System and
ORDEAL
Communications
Sequential Events
Crew Equipment and Couches
Displays and Controls
Guidance and Navigation
Earth Recovery System
Hea_ Shield
Service Propulsion System (LES Motors)
Cryogenics
Fuel Cells
Total CSM.
_.3_ CSM General
The following additional sections will be set up for the CARR report
and CARID numbering, but will not require separate SSAD books:
5.2_ ACE
5.26 Plumbing
5.27 Pressure Vessels
5.29 Safety
5.31 Configuration
5.32 Thermal Control
5.33 Quality Assurance
It is requested that all division representatives having a working
interest in this review provide a list of individuals by name and
review area (subsystem, special teams, etc.), including contractor
personnel, who will participate in the CARR, and dates of participation.
This information may be furnished on the enclosed sheet and submitted
at least five working days prior to the start of the review to
H. L. Brendle, PF6, MSC. Members of the special team will be notified
of their required attendance. For subsystems requiring more than two
team members, or more than one R&QAmember, it is requested a brief
rationale for the requirements be submitted on the enclosed form.
The Manager, NASA-Downey; Manager, RASP0-KSC; Director, Spacecraft
Operations, KSC, should provide a list of individuals, from their
respective offices, who will participate in the CARR and the dates of
participation. This information may be furnished on the enclosed
sheet and submitted at least five working days prior to the start of
the review to H. L. Brendle, PF6, _C.
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Team Report Preparation
The leaders of the Reliability and Quality, subsyst_,, and special
teams, will be responsible for consolidation of their findings and
preparation of the team report to the CARR Board.
NASA Pre-Board
There will not be a NASA Pre-Board for Phase I CARR on Spacecraft 118.
General
The coordinator for the team reviews is the ASPO CSM 118 Project
Engineer, H. F. Rees. The CARR Secretary, H. L. Brendle, will be
in attendance during the team reviews and should be advised of team
progress through submittal of daily team minutes. Questions concerning
the planning and implementation of this review should be directed to
H. L. Brendle, PF6, extension 5311, MS C, Houston.
Aaron Cohen
Enclosure
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REPLY TO
ATTN OF:
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
HOUSTON,TEXAS 77058
_ORA_TD_
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
PF6/Chief, Review Planning Office
Customer Acceptance Readiness Review for Spacecraft 118,
Phase I
The following persons will attend and be responsible for the CARR
activities per letter PF6-0/49-72.
NAME CODE DATE FUNCTION
Signed
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APPENDIX G
CUSTOMER ACCEPTANCE REVIEW ITEMDISPOS ITION
WITH CLOSEOUT DOCUMENTATION
SPACE DIVISION oy NORTH AMERICAN R('R'_.KWELI, C()RP()RATION
CUSTOMER ACCEPTANCE REVIEW ITEM DISPOSITION (CARID) FORM
Customer's Review Item Definition Sheet
CSM
Phase i System116 TII ECS
Initiator
R. Yo_6/D. H_es
Reference Documentation
CAR PF i12010.,-i} DR A189587
J System No.
2.5
I Orianization Phone No.
_]oein_/MSC/ECS _83- 5536
Date
3/17/72
Part No.
PROBLEM (Title) Inspection of Toggle Actuators
CAR PF 112010-1 requires inspection by recording position of retaining nut and
number of shims for each item. DR records only number of shims. Position
(flushness) of nuts is unknown.
RECOMMENDED ACTION JUSTIFICATION
Reinspect per CAR requirements
RECOMMENDED CONSTRAINT Shipment
Pre-Board Comments Remarks Direction Refer to Board _ Disposihoned
(See Decision Summary)
NR stated that the flushness was verified per DRSS but did not have the
paper available, but would verify and document.
The chairman requested the flushness of the nuts be reverified during PCO-2.
Action Requ,red to Close CARID
NR verify flushness of nuts.
'Board Comments Remarks Direction
Act,on Required to Close CARID
i
Board Decision Summary (To be filled in by the Boardor Pre-Board)
Dixpoeltton: CATF_ORT
Action this SC I _,.:
Clomed-&ctton/SC Subs II []
Cloeed-Un_ed Anomaly III []
Closed-No Action Required IV []
Other ¥ []
Wit_rawn VI []
NASA Board Cha,man Signature ............
Action:
Contractor
NASA
HARDWARE
SOFTWARE
El
[-]
Constraint:
Subsystems Test [-I
Combined Sys. Test []
Integrated Test []
Acceptance []
Other []
None []
Date
(PCO-2)
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SPACE DIVISION or NORTII AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION
CUSTOMER ACCEPTANCE REVIEW ITEM DISPOSITION (CARID)
FORM
Contractor's Review Item Resolution Sheet
CSM Phase
116 III
Orilinator
R. Yotmg/D. Hughes
System
ReferenceDocumentation
CAR PF 112010-1; DR A189587
ECS
SystemNo.
2.5
Dept. PhoneNo.
Boeing/MSC/ECS 483-5536
(Pr0biemTitle) Irmpection of toggle act_tors
Resolution/Actiontobetaken:
Signature/C. E. Kindelberger
AuthorizedNRRepresentative
CARIDNo.
Zlf.2._,__
Dote
3/17/72
Five valves were checked for proper number of shims on ll-h-71.
All valves had 6 shims except the valve on panel 600 which had
7 shims. The replacement valve SN 00hh was inspected for shims
on 11-8-71 and it had 6. Position of retaining nut will be
accomplished per instructions of CAR PF 112010-1. DR A166584 with
CAR instructions is open against CSM 116 and will be accomplished
during PCO-2 scheduled for June 23, 1972, through August i, 1972.
3/21/72
Date
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CARID 116.2.5.5
Continuation Sheet A
i
!
Opticprobeinsertion
housing
ng nut
le holding
plate i
,_Toggle arm to beheld
in straight position
__ _ Opticprobeinsertion
andclearance
--:
I
Iil
t
\\
\ \\
i'"\\\\
\\
\\
(\\
'// X
r/
,'t q
A
02 regulator in-placeinspection
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SPACE DIVISION oF NORTll AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORAI"If)N
CUSTOMER ACCEPTANCE REVIEW ITEM DISPOSITION (CARID)
FORM
Contractor's Review Item Resolution Sheet
CSM I Phase116 III
Originator
R. Young/D. Hughes
ReferenceDocumentation
System / SystemNo.
ECS 1 2.5
I Dept. I PhoneNo.
Boein_/MSC/ECS h83-5536
CAR PF 112010-1; DR A189587
CARIDNo.
Datell6.2. _. _ R-I
3/17/72
(ProblemTitle) Inspection of toggle actuators
Resolution/Actionto betaken:
The position of the toggle actuator retaining nut will be
verified during PCO-2, CSM ll6. To ensure that this action
occurs, a DR A16658h has been initiated against CSM 116 and
is currently open in the CSM 116 V36-GEN FAIR book. The
DR reads as follows: "When ready to relnspect the 116 toggle
ches, contact R. A. Kotler, ext. 4178. The retaining nut
_- the toggle parts S/B flush or recessed in the valve
n_- _.g If the nut projects above the valve, notify
neering for disposition. Record the nut position of
5 toggle actuators, panel 351 sys. A , panel 351 sys. B ,
panel 600, panel 601, pane_ .
Report inspection results to PAA."
Slgnature/C. E. Kindleberger
Author,zedNRRepresentat,ve
4/12/72
Date
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_biect:
-),.
UHITED STATES GOVERNMENT
CSM 116 _ III CABID's
2.5.5 and 2.7.2
r
NA/E. M. Fields
Attention: Cal Bennett/HS-05
I
by: 5-11-72
_DATE OF M[SSAG£
5-2-72
DATE OF REPLY
INSTRUCTIONS
Use routing symbols whenever pos-
sible.
SENDER:
Forward originol and one copy.
Conserve spece.
RECEIVER:
Rep|y below the messsEe, keep
one copy, return one copy.
mFOUD
USE IIRtEF. iNIr_AL I..ANGUAG(
Please review the attached NR replies with regard to the subject CARID's and
indicate in writing if they are adequate to close these CARID's. If not, explain
why!
2.5.5 _..____open _ closed (Reply dated h/12/72)
2.7.2 __.._open X closed (MCR 31156, h-lh-72)
Comments: if req'd
_OLD--
Signature/E. M. Fields or Designee
F
Frank Sakmar/PF6 X-5221
CSM Review Planning Office
_.1
I.TO BE RETAINED BY ADDRESSEE
OPTIONAL FORM 27
OCTOBER 1962
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101 - 11.6
8T
Subiect:
To:.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
2-Way Memo
CSM 116 ¢ III CARID
2.5.5 Inspection of Toggle Actuators
r
EC3/Don Hughes
[_ _]
0
by: 5-10-72
DATE @F MEIIA@g
5-3-72
DATE OF _M.Y
INSTRUCTIONS
Use rout_mi[ s_mbols whenever pos-
sible.
SENDER:
Forward orllinal end one copy.
Conserve space,
RECEIVER:
Reply below the message, keep
One copy. return one copy.
UIENII[F, INFORMAI. L,AN@UA(IE
Please review the attached NR reply dated _-12-72 with regard to the action assigned
the subject CARID and indicate in writing if it is adequate to close this CARID.
Action: NR verify flushness of nuts during PC0-2.
CARID 2.5.59Pen _ closed
Comments: if req'd
It should be noted that if the nut is not flush or recessed, the valve shall be
rejected.
WOLD--
Signature/Don Hu_hes
From:
F
Frank Sakmar/PF6
X-5221
CSM Review Planning Office
-7
L d
5027 - 102 I. TO BE RETAINED BY ADDRESSEE
OPTIONAL FORM 27
OCTOBER |962
GIlA FPMR (41 CFR) 10t - 11.6
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APPENDI X H
MI NUTES OF A CUSTOMER ACCEPTANCE
READI NESS REVIEW BOARD MEETING
PF6-0/10-72
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
MINUTES OF HEETING
CUSTOHER ACCEPTANCE READINESS REVIEW BOARD
CSH 117 PHASE 1
JANUARY 14, 1972
The Customer Acceptance Readiness Review (CARR) Board for CSH 117
Phase I convened at 10:50 a.m., c.s.t., via telecosmunications in
Room 602, Building 2, HSC, Houston, Texas, and in the Program Hanager's
Conference Room, Building 290, North American Rockwell Corporation,
Downey, Calif.
Board Hembers
Chairman : A. Cohen, HSC @ HSC
Hember : L. Chauvin, HSC @ HSC
H. Fields, HSC @ HSC
W. Graves, Downey @ Downey
J. Hoffman, HSC @ MSC
D. HaThew, HSC @ Downey
F. Hiller, Downey @ Downey
C. Perner, HSC @ HSC
H. Rees, HSC @ HSC
Secretariat H. L. Brendle
F. Sakmar (Representative)
NR Representatives
Astronaut Representatives:
G. Jells
G. Herrick
D. Thomas
E. Smith
A. Bean
V. Brand
Proceedings
In accordance with the letter of implementation, PF6-0/235-71, dated
Dec. 20, 1971, the reliability, quality., subsystem, and speclal review
teams were in session at NR-Downe7, Jan. 10-12, 1972. During this time,
the teams reviewed the data provided by the contractor. The contractor
provided the data in accordance with the CARR plan. The team members
recorded their findings on daily team minutes with discussion issues
presented on Customer Acceptance Review Item Disposition (CARID) forms.
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Readiness statements for CSM 117 initiation of subsystem tests were
executed by applicable NASA-MSC subszste m manager, NASA-Downey subsystem
test engineer, and NASA-MSC R_QArepresentatives.
CARID 2.1.1
PROBLEM
Spillage of Unknown Fluid on (24 Aft Bulkhead
Upon removal of protective covers from the command module floor interior
at the start of the third shift, May 7, 1970, an oily substance, red in
color llke machine coolant oil, was discovered on the floor of the CM
aft bulkhead. Also metal chips from dri11ing were scattered throughout
the CM floor.
DISCUSSION
NR reported that the only fluid which could have been in use at the time and
which fits the description is machining oil. A suspect material would
be Alumintap, an organic fluid customarily used for aluminum machining.
The fluid was removed by wiping with MEK and ultraviolet light was used
to verify removal. Ultraviolet light will show the smallest trace of the
subject fluid. The metal chips were removed by vacuuming.
NR considers this condition acceptable with no further action required.
The chairman asked if corrective action has been taken to preclude this
incident from occurring in the future. NR indicated they have taken
precautionary measures for preventing recurrence. The NR answer was
acceptable to the board.
ACTION Closed
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CARID 2.1.2 Over TorcLue of Fitting Attach Screws
PROBLEM
During installation of the V36-311048-3 fitting (3 places), the
LDl12-0011-0504 screws (8 per fitting) were torqued to 200 in. lbs.
The maximum allowable torque is 120 in. lbs. plus 10 percent per
_0101-005, table VIII. The screws are considered not to be over-
stressed and accepted for unrestricted usage.
DISCUSSION
NR stated that the minimum qualifying torque requirement for the LDI12-
0011-0304 screws is 250 in. lbs. as indicated in corporate standards
LDI12-0010 through LDl12-0015.
Mr. Brand, CB, asked what would happen if the subject screws failed.
Mr. Sandars, ES, stated that from a structual standpoint the failures
would be Insignificant and that there was no technical concern.
This was acceptable to the board.
ACTION - Closed
CARID 5.5.1 SMRadiator Panel Water Glycol Spillage
PROBLEM
During water glycol flow verification tests on the sector II and III
radiator panel, tygon tubing came loose causing spillage of water
glycol on the panel and through bolt holes on the inside of the panel.
The panel was not installed in the SM. MRB analysls indicated the
panel is acceptable for unrestricL_d usage.
DISCUSSION
NR reported that after the water glycol was spilled on sector II and III
panel_ the structure was cleaned and chemically tested per Standard Repair
ST 4.2. No evidence of glycol contamination remained. A close visual
inspection revealed no contamination of the external cork and finish. The
position of the panel allowed the water glycol to immediately drain to the
center of the panel and through the attach holes.
NR recommended that no fUrther action be taken.
The chairman asked what NR has done to preclude the tygon tubing from
coming loose again. NR indicatedprecautionary measures will be taken
to eliminate this type of incident.
This was acceptable to the board.
ACTION - Closed
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CARID 3.6.1 DCS 4192ClosedWithout Contractual compliance
PROBLEM
DCS 4192 has been closed without contractual compliance and without
any indication of open requirements in the vehicle records. DCS 4192
was closed with TVAR 39049, dated Nov. 9, 1971, identified as "not
acceptable" to NASA engineering as it does not meet the requirements
of the end item part II specification.
DISCUSSION
NR stated that the recommended action of CARID 5.6.1 has been completed.
NR letter 72MA299 transmitted SCN 5316 to end item specification
SID64-134SD, Part II. SCN 5315 revises the SM RCS quad proof pressure
from 315 _ 5 psig to 305 _ 5 psig from CSM's 117-119.
The NR answer was acceptable for CSM 117; however_ the chairman asked
what was done for CSM 116. Mr. Jells, NR, indicated he would like to
discuss the CSM 116 issue outside of this meeting. This was agreeable
to the chairman. The CSM 116 issue remains open.
ACTION - Closed (CSM 117 only)
CARID 3.6.2
PROBLEM
Overpower at Transducer Signal Conditioner
Instrumentation power on digital voltmeter (DVM I) oxidizer manifold
transducer reads 2.5 volts and should be not more than 0.5 volts.
Investigation of this problem indicates output of the signal conditioner
was overloaded with 28 volts DC during reconfiguration. A corrective
action TVAR has been written to insure the problem does not happen again.
DISCUSSION
NR reported that the valve latching verification testing and final
instrumentation checks in preparation for delivery utilize the same test
cell recording equipment, but with significant differences in patching
configuration. Normally, power is removed and the test cell configuration
is repatched between test sequences; however, during a rewrite of MA0710-4192
these requirements were inadvertently omitted thus permitting latching voltage
(28V) application to the subject signal conditioner. TVAR 39045 was
prepared to remove power from test equipment between test phases. TVAR
40147 was prepared to ensure test equipment is properly configured, thus
correcting the test procedure.
94
In addition, the pressure measurement system for measurement SR5821P,
oxygen manifold pressure, system D (part no. ME431-0069-0132) was
removed and replaced with a new part. The system retest was acceptable
and the failed part returned to the supplier for rework.
The chairman noted that there is no spacecraft issue and that the
procedures have been changed.
The NR answer was acceptable to the board.
ACTION - Closed
CARID 3.6.3
PROBLEM
Dropped Diffuser Assembl 7
Diffuser assembly, ME282-0606-0007, was dropped from a desk top at Bell
damaging the propellant outlet tube and bleed tube. Subsequently, the
assembly was installed in secondary oxidizer tank, S/N 139, with
diffuser leakage occurring. The diffuser assembly was repaired and
satisfactorily tested per Bell MDR #60253.
DISCUSSION
NR reported that Bell Aerosystems initiated final rework of diffuser
assembly, 8271-471200-11, S/N 268 per MDR 60253, with proof pressure
leakage test and X-ray inspections, completed successfully. After
installation into the tank assembly, helium pressure and leakage tests
were performed per Bell ATF 8271-928061. Following receipt at NR/SD,
the tank assembly was installed in CSM 117 and leakage and proof pressure
tests performed successfully per MA0710-4192. NR considers the tank,
including subject diffuser assembly, acceptable for unrestricted usage.
The chairman asked if there were any concerns by E_D and R_QA regarding
this incident. No concerns were expressed.
The NR answer was acceptable to the board.
ACTION - Closed
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CARID 2.11.1 Coax Cable Dropped During Fabrication
PROBLEM
Coax cable, P/N V36-444330, was dropped approximate17 3 feet from the
workbench. The contact insulator bushing, braid clamp, 'N" groove
gasket, and large washer were installed. This mishap occurred during
fabrication, and the connector was not installed.
DISCUSSION
NR reported that the V36-444330 coaxial cable is a RG1421U coax connector
assembly used to interconnect the VHF/AM and the digital ranging
generator. At the time of the occurrence of the reported droppage, the
assembly was in fabrication process. No parts of the connector that are
susceptible to damage from such a drop were installed. Subsequent to
completion of the assembly fabrication, the completed item was subjected
to and passed acceptance test per MA0205-0161, range II, verifying
acceptance for unrestricted use.
The chairman noted that there is no spacecraft issue and that the
procedures have been changed.
The NR answer was acceptable to the board.
ACTION - Closed
CARID 2.13.1 Control of Schedules fOr CM Crew Items Required b_ MSFC
PROBLEM
SSAD documentation 2.15, section 8, indicates that crew equipment
manufacturing delivery schedules are established for CH usage only.
However, many crew items are required in support of HSFC reviews;
i.e., CC?F and altitude chamber test. These items and delivery dates
were identified to NR by NASA letter EC75NR71-0729-BT2-422, dated
Oct. 27, 1971. Examples of crew items listed in the referenced SSAD
are:
CSM ENGR MSFC
NOMENCLATURE P/N RELEASE DATE NEED DATE
A2 Locker V56-787502 4-28-72 5-1-72
AS Locker V56-787505 4-28-72 3-1-72
A7 Locker V56-787507 4-28-72 5-1-72
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DISCUSSION
NR stated that a plan is being prepared to support both requirements
(reference UCN 31114) and is expected to be released on Jan. 21, 1972.
The chairman asked if NASA-MSC has provided sufficient information to
NR for completion of its plan in support of the subject requirements.
Mr. HcA11ister, EC, indicated that the dates provided by him to NR
were complete and to the best of his knowledge accurate. Hr. McA11ister
coordinated with the Skylab Program Office on the dates provided NR.
The chairman stressed that NR must have realistic dates to support
the subject requirements. Since this issue was related to the program
and not CSH 117 only, the CARID is closed; however, the issue remains
open for the program.
ACTION - Closed
PROGR_.M ACTION
(I) NASA, L. Chauvin, EN, assure that realistic schedules are provided
to NR.
(2) NR review with Mr. Cohen the program plan for this issue by Jan. 21,
1972.
CARID 5.24.1
PROBLEM
Experiment SO71/72 Real Time Data Display fo T ACE
The ACE subprogram computer specification (MA0201-0499) and the
CSM 117 programming requirements process specification (MA0201-5875)
have not been revised to reflect subprogram UO051, "Process
Circadian Periodicity Experiments Data", for use at Downey during
DC8 8100 and DCS 0131 with one ACE computer room. The revision 1 into
_R 31258 has not yet been released to manufacturing.
DISCUSSION
NR reported that upon successful completion of Phase I verification of
the new test file tape incorporating the new subProgram U0051 (to be
released by 2-1-72), NR will submit a revised ECP (ref. HCR 31238) to
NASA. The ECP will reflect the use of one test file tape and the use
o£ one computer room.
In addition, NASA will be asked to supply a copy of the test file tape,
a second computer room, and G.E. and experiment contractor support as
a contingency, if operational conditions so dictate.
The NR answer was acceptable to the board.
ACTION - Closed
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CARID 4.34.1 Fuel Overboard Dump Connection Improperly Protected
PROBLEM
The fuel overboard dump connection is protected by a makeshift method
(unknown) per DRSS S03S150, item 091, with no corrective action.
DISCUSSION
NR reported that the incident occurred in B290 clean room and involves
a non-critical ventline through the CM heat shield beyond an inline
squib. The unsatisfactory condition was loose tape which was replaced
and appeared to be makeshift. The tape, overwra B and bag were
removed and replaced per MA0616-035.
NR and NASA approved the corrective action on July 30, 1971. NR
recommends no additional corrective action.
The chairman noted there was no technical concern;only a paperwork
problem.
The NR reply was acceptable to the board.
ACTION - Closed
CARID 4.34.2 CSM 117 OVerage Parts
PROBLEM
Several CSM 117 parts will exceed their established expiration date as
shown in MA0201-15695 on or before 80 days after the currently scheduled
launch date, Oct. 19, 1973. These parts include seven valves, P/N ME284-
0357-0001; four tanks, P/N's ME282-0006-0007, ME282-0008-0006, ME192-0008-
0]01, and ME192-0036-0004; two couplings, P/N ME273-0074-I004; and a
reservoir, ME282-0049-0001.
DISCUSSION
NR stated that all age life DR's are being processed by ALAS or MRB
per the instructions of NR internal letter no. 695-100-000-71-248,
dated Dec. 20, 1971.
The chairman indicated that there appears to be no technical concern
regarding these items. Mr. Raciti, NB, speaking for R6QA, agreed with
the chairman. It is just a matter of the paperwork being processed.
The NR reply was acceptable.
ACTION - Closed
98
This concluded the agenda items.
The chairman polled the board for conunents and concerns.
It was generally agreed there were no additional concerns and that CSM 117
was a cleaner spacecraft, problem-wlse than CSM 116 at its Phase I CARR
milestone review.
The meeting was adjourned at 11:25 a.m., c.s.t.
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APPENDIX I
BRI EFING REQUIREMENTSFOR CUSTOMER
ACCEPTANCEREADINESS REVI EWS
SUMMARYOF REQUIREMENTS
The following briefings shall be prepared for presentation at the Phase HI Customer
Acceptance Readiness Review Board only. Each briefing will show status and impact
assessment. Items that will not support shipment or altitude chamber testing or that
may result in a hardware change will be emphasized.
1. Command and service module (CSM) status/schedule position
2. Open work to be transferred to John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
3. Open specification change notices (SCN's)
4. Waivers
5. Open certification tests
6. Open program failures and unsatisfactory conditions
7. Open customer acceptance review item dispositions (CARID's)
8. Safety assessment
DETAIL OF REQUIREMENTS
The following list contains details of briefing requirements.
1. CSM status/schedule position m Summarize, by use of a schedule chart, the
significant work remaining to be accomplished before shipment.
2. Open work to be transferred to KSC
a. Summarize, by task, the changes to the baseline (new effort) transferred
to KSC.
b. Summarize, by task_ (1) the hardware shortages and (2) the test or retest
effort normally accomplished at Downey transferred to KSC.
3. Open SCN's -- Summarize the SCN's that affect the spacecraft under review
and that are pending NASA approval or contractor submittal to NASA.
4. Waivers m Summarize each waiver or deviation that affects the spacecraft
under review_ and show the rationale for acceptability.
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a.
b.
necessary.
5. Open certification tests
a. Summarize, by quantity and type, the open certification tests affecting the
spacecraft under review.
b. Identify each test having a scheduled completion after shipment of the
spacecraft, showing the type of test and the scheduled completion date.
6. Open program failures and unsatisfactory conditions
a. Summarize, by quantity and type, the open program failures affecting the
spacecraft under review.
b. Identify each significant failure having potential hardware impact to the
spacecraft under review, giving a problem description, a plan for resolution, and a
closeout schedule.
7. Open CARID's
Summarize the open CARID's as related to hardware or software.
Summarize the resolution to the CARID's, using a special briefing if
8. Safety assessment m Summarize the activities of the contractor safety orga-
nizations, including the accidents and incidents related to the spacecraft under review
with specific dates of occurrence and rationale for acceptance.
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